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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis engages with two bodies of scholarship: Japanese diplomacy and internationalism. 
Japan’s interaction with the international community and how it started and developed in the 
course of history is analysed. It is argued that Japanese leaders had strived to grant Japan a 
just place in the world. Their path, however, was not a straightforward one. The problems 
caused by identity issues, a West-centric world order, and the concept of ‘honour’ muddled 
the Japanese attempt. The words and practices of key figures were examined to illustrate the 
comprehensive development of Japanese diplomacy and internationalism between 1853 and 
2006.   
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About Japanese and Chinese Names 
 
I have rendered Japanese and Chinese names in their original style, with the family name 
preceding the given name – except for the ones in which the Western order is more frequently 
used in the discipline (e.g. Akira Iriye). 
 
 
 
About the Translations 
 
All translations from Japanese primary and secondary sources are my own otherwise 
footnoted.  
 
 
Chronological Note 
 
Modern Japanese imperial era names: 
Meiji (1868-1912) 
Taisho (1912-1926) 
Showa (1926-1989) 
Heisei (1989-present) 
 
Emperor of Japan in reign: 
Mutsuhito / Emperor Meiji (1867-1912) 
Yoshihito / Emperor Taisho (1912-26) 
Hirohito / Emperor Showa (1926-89) 
Akihito (1989-present) 
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“An understanding of the importance of the desire for recognition as the motor of history 
allows us to reinterpret many phenomena that are otherwise seemingly unfair to us, such as 
culture, religion, work, nationalism and war.”1 
 
 
Francis Fukuyama 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man  (New York: The Free Press, 1992). xix. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Japanese Internationalism 
 
 
 
“It is one of the unwritten rules of history that civilizations have made their greatest leap 
forward after having come into contact with other, different civilizations.” 2 
 
                             – Nakasone Yasuhiro (Former Prime Minister of Japan, 1982-87) 
 
 
 
The nineteenth century saw the acceleration of globalization. The worldwide expansion of 
Euro-American empires, development of technologies and interdependence of economic 
activities brought peoples from different cultural backgrounds to interact with each other.
3
 
This interchange of different civilizations built a transnational network that urged 
policymakers and intellectuals to generate the concept of “internationalism” to describe and 
explain the dynamics of the international community.
4
   
 
It is important to address the question of the definition of internationalism since there are 
many schools of thought.
5
 Political historians such as Philip W. Jones propose that 
                                                          
2
 Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Foreign Policy and Constitutional Views," Journal of International Affairs 37, no. 1 
(1983): 4. 
3
 Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary 
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2-6. 
4
 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary 
World (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). 8.; And: Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-
First Century (London: Fontana Press, 1993). 347-48. 
5
 Jessamym Reich Abel, "Warring Internationalisms: Multilateral Thinking in Japan, 1933 - 1964" (Columbia 
University, 2004), 4. 
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internationalism is constituted of “national sovereignty” and “international order.” 6 This 
school of thought maintains that the locomotive of international community is the national 
interests of countries that ‘interlink’ states for both coexistent and self-benefitting purposes.7 
The Second World War (WWII) is often employed as a case study. The Great Powers formed 
alliances and waged aggression across the globe for the expansion of their national interests. 
On the other hand, historians like John G. Ruggie point out the importance of economic 
interdependence.
8
 They argue that interdependence created the transnational network called 
“world economy” that urged peoples of many countries to actively interact with each other 
for profit-making activities.
9
 Ruggie claims that this dynamics of economic interdependence 
is the determinant that has coloured the nature of international community.  
 
While historians of different specializations have generated their own definition of 
internationalism, a general consensus is noticeable. That is to regard, as the scholar Carten 
Holbraad has pointed out, the “bonds” that interlink states, inter-governmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations and non-state actors as the chief dynamic of international 
relations.
10
 Politics and economy do have different impacts on defining the character of 
interstate relations, yet they have both acted as a “bond” that connects states and peoples 
                                                          
6
 Philip W. Jones and David Coleman, The United Nations and Education: Multilateralism, Development and 
Globalization  (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2005). 24. 
7
 See, also: Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics  (Berkeley: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979). 105; Kjell Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation (New 
York: Routledge, 1994). Goldmann highlights that “coexistent purposes” include diplomatic interchanges such 
as the formation of alliances, holding of conferences and establishment of regional/international coalitions. In 
this sort of internationalism, the main objective of the participating countries is to work for the prosperity of 
everyone in the concert. On the contrary, “self-benefitting purposes” are ones in which countries strive only for 
their own benefits – such as wars and secret diplomacies. For example, Hitler’s Nazi Germany was a great 
example of the self-benefiting internationalism in which the Third Reich invaded European nations one after 
another for its own development. Yet, as Goldmann notes, both the coexistent and self-benefitting interactions 
do bring nations of the world ‘together’ in the sense that interstate relations are indeed in existence.   
8
 John Gerard Ruggie, ed. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Reform (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 8-10. 
9
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics: 105-06. 
10
 Castern Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought  (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003). 1. 
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together. Consequently, Holbraad’s definition that internationalism is “the ideology of 
international bonding” is used in this thesis.11  
The theme of Japanese diplomacy has been explored by many historians including Thomas 
W. Burkman, Kenneth B. Pyle and Akira Iriye.
12
 They have provided thorough analysis on 
Japanese foreign policy and Japan’s international relations. The historians have generally 
examined Japanese relations with key strategic partners by investigating the key incidents, 
causes and effects, international climate and domestic opinion in history. For example, Pyle’s 
The Making of Modern Japan analyzes the history of Japanese political economy in the post-
1945 years.
13
 Similarly, Iriye’s Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 
1897 – 1911 investigates Japan-US relations in the era of expansionism and imperialism.14 
 
These published works have mostly concentrated on Japan’s political, economic and/or 
military relations with America and/or China as their main theme of investigation. For the 
long history of interactions, the historians maintain that Washington and Beijing occupy an 
important place in Tokyo’s foreign policy agenda.15 A clear tendency of popularity is also 
                                                          
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Their notable scholarship includes the following: Thomas W. Burkman, Japan and the League of Nations: 
Empire and World Order, 1914-1938  (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008); Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan 
Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007); Kenneth 
B. Pyle, "Japan’s Historic Change of Course," Current History 195, no. 692 (September 2006); Kenneth B. Pyle, 
The Making of Modern Japan  (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1997); Kenneth B. Pyle, "Profound 
Forces in the Making of Modern Japan," The Journal of Japanese Studies 32, no. 2 (Summer 2006); Akira Iriye, 
Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American – East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, Inc., 1967); Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction  (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall Inc, 1974); Akira Iriye, "Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status," in Cambridge History of Japan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 
1897 – 1911 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); Akira Iriye, Shin – Nihon no Gaiko [Japan’s 
Diplomacy – New Edition]  (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1991); Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen, eds., The United 
States and Japan in the Post-War World (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1989). 
13
 See, Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan. 
14
 See, Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897 – 1911  
15
 Prominent works by other authors include: Nobuya Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on 
Japan’s China Policy, 1924-1929  (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972); Dick Stegewerns, 
"The Japanese 'Civilization Critics' and the National Identity of their Asian Neighbours, 1918-1932: The Case of 
Yoshino Sakuzo," in Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945, ed. Li Narangoa and Robert 
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noticeable in the case studies the historians have chosen to analyse. The Meiji Restoration 
(the late 1860s), the Second World War (1941-45) and the post-war economic miracle 
(1950s-80s) are three of the most referenced incidents. They are often treated as the “turning 
points” in the history of Japanese diplomacy as important development and changes in the 
foreign policies were seen in these periods.
16
 For example, Japanese leaders in the years of 
WWII practiced an expansionist and militarist strategy and criticized the principles of pro-
Western foreign policy which had been the national consensus since the Meiji Restoration in 
1860s.   
 
There are yet two major unsolved problems in the discipline preventing a clear understanding 
of Japanese diplomacy. First, the subject of the connections between Japan and diplomatic 
ideology is an undeveloped field of study. In other words, historians have investigated what 
happened in the past and how it occurred mostly from political, military and economic 
perspectives. This means that the historians have not examined the dynamics of the 
ideological drives behind the diplomatic decisions, however.
17
 Only rarely do historians make 
a conscious use of topics such as: how Japanese policymakers and intellectuals saw Japan’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cribb (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Morinosuke Kajima, The Emergence of Japan as a World Power, 
1895-1925  (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co. Publishers, 1968).; Marjorie Dryburgh, North China and Japanese 
Expansion, 1933-1937  (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000); Kyoko Hatakeyama and Craig F. Freedman, 
Snow on the Pine: Japan's Quest for a Leadership Role in Asia  (Singapore: Stallion Press, 2010); Julie Gilson, 
"Building Peace or Following the Leader? Japan's Peace Consolidation Diplomacy," Pacific Affairs 80, no. 1 
(2007).; Carol Gluck, "Japan and America: A Tale of Two Civilizations," Social Education 55, no. 7 (November 
1991).; Robert A. Scalapino, "The American Occupation of Japan – Perspectives after Three Decades," Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 428(November 1976).; and Ezra F. Vogel, "Japanese-
American Relations after the Cold War," Daedalus 121, no. 4 (Fall 1992).  
16
 Examples include: George Akita, "The Meiji Constitution in Practice: The First Diet," The Journal of Asian 
Studies 22, no. 1 (1962); David Williams, Japan: Beyond the End of History  (Cornwall: Routledge, 1994).; 
Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1985).; Jansen B. Marius, "The Meiji Restoration," in Cambridge History of Japan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).; Iriye, Shin – Nihon no Gaiko [Japan’s Diplomacy – New Edition].; Eri 
Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan's War, 1931-1945  (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).; Mayumi Itoh, 
"Economic Myths Explained: Japan’s Abiding Sakoku Mentality," Orbis 40, no. 2 (Spring 1996).; Min Wang, 
"Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan has used its Economic Power in the Past Decade," 
International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1995). 
17
 See, Nigel Gould-Davies, "Ideology," in Palgrave Advances in International History, ed. Patrick Finney 
(Basingstoke: Palgave MacMillan, 2005). 
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place and role in the world; how Japan could (and should) construct international bonds; and 
what diplomatic goals they must regard as the grand strategy of the Japanese nation.
18
 These 
themes are important in understanding Japan’s diplomatic ideology since they shape the “core 
values” of Japanese interaction with the world – which is going to be discussed later.  
 
Second, little work has been done to illustrate the comprehensive development of Japanese 
diplomacy. As maintained earlier, many of the published works have tended to focus on a 
certain period of historical importance.
19
 This is unfortunate because historians have 
neglected to analyse the consistency, causal relationships and changes seen in Japanese 
diplomacy between the historically important period of the nineteenth and twenty-first 
centuries.
20
 In this era, the form of diplomacy saw dramatic changes.
  21
 While bilateral and 
mono-cultural diplomacy were the mainstream form of international relations prior to the 
nineteenth century, multilateral diplomacy then emerged as the leading practice particularly 
from the twentieth century.
22
 As seen in the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920, 
                                                          
18
 James W. White, Michio Umegaki, and Thomas R.H. Havens, eds., The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern 
Japan between East and West (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990), 2. 
19
 Kenneth B. Pyle’s Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan and Gilbert Rozman’s Internationalism 
and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei are two of the few works that have taken the 
longue duree approach in writing Japanese history. These works are useful in tracing how professional 
intellectuals have written history in an overview. However, their scope of sight is limited. While Pyle has only 
looked at post-1945 years, Rozman only compared Japanese history in the 1880s to 1970s. In this regard, I must 
say there is not many works done on writing Japanese diplomatic history in longue duree has been done in the 
discipline. For Pyle’s and Rozman’s works, see: Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan."; and 
Gilbert Rozman, "Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei," Japanese 
Journal of Political Science 9, no. 2 (2008).  
20
 Micheline R. Ishay, Internationalism and its Betrayal: Contradictions of Modernity (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1995). xvi-xxi. Ishay comments: “ [internationalism is] Not a static concept, but rather a 
‘process’ sui generis … Internationalism has changed over time, but the core concept can be identified 
throughout history. Internationalism, unlike realism which international relations is conceived as a global system 
of relationship between monolithic states, guidelines describing social relations between states and within states. 
Internationalism assumes a dynamic between the global and the domestic social arrangement.” Thus, I examine 
both the constants and variables, so that, what the “core value” and the “values that change depending on the 
international climate” could be distinguished.  
21
 Takahiro Shinyo, Takyokuka Sekai no Nihon Gaiko Senryaku [Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Multi-
Polarizing World] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinsho, 2010). 
22
 I define “bilateral diplomacy” as an interstate relation in which two countries are involved (e.g. the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902). “Mono-cultural diplomacy” refers to an interstate relation where countries of 
similar (or the same) civilizational backgrounds are involved (e.g. the Napoleonic Wars, the Sino-Japanese War 
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countries of different civilizational backgrounds had then begun to interact with each other 
more than ever before.
23
 It is a concern, therefore, that historians have yet to identify how the 
changing climate in the international community had affected the character of Japanese 
diplomatic thought and vice versa.
24
  
 
This thesis thus aims to reinvestigate the history of Japanese diplomacy. It examines how the 
Japanese perception of international politics had developed between 1853 and 2006 by 
exploring the two unfinished problems, as discussed above. I analyse the key incidents in the 
history of Japanese diplomacy as a chain of events that causally constituted this ideology 
called “Japanese internationalism” – or the Japanese perception of international bonding.  
 
The investigation into the two unfinished problems is important because it would reveal the 
“core values” and the “situational values” of Japanese diplomacy. I define the former phrase 
as the consistency seen in the series of diplomatic policymaking process or as the sense of 
importance that authorities in history had traditionally understood as the national consensus 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of 1894-95, and the Triple Alliance of 1882). Lastly, multilateral diplomacy refers to an interstate relation where 
more than two countries of different civilizational backgrounds are involved (e.g. the League of Nations of 1920, 
the United Nations of 1945, and UNESCO of 1945). For more on types of diplomacy, see: Seven B. Gareis and 
Johannes Varwick, The United Nations: An Introduction  (London: Palgrave, 2003). 
23
 Jan Melissen, ed. The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), 90. 
24
 Zara Steiner, "On writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More," International Affairs 73 no. 3 
(1997): 533-34.The historian Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 until 2000 is a good example of study in which history is written in longue duree 
with the purpose to investigate the determinant that has defined the rise and fall of the Great Powers in history. 
Based on his research on 500 years of world history, Kennedy argues that economics and military are not the 
definite determinants of the rise of fall of powers, nevertheless definitely serves as the “reason for the success 
and failure of each nation.” (p.xxiv) In other words, Kennedy highlights economy and military strengths as the 
core value of national development that vitally influenced the rise and fall of the Great Powers. I aim to do the 
same in this thesis. Through looking at Japanese history between 1853 and 2006, I purpose to figure out what 
the factor that has coloured the diplomatic behaviour and thoughts of the Japanese policymakers and 
intellectuals. For more, see: Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 until 2000  (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
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of the Japanese state.
25
 The latter phrase refers to the values that changed accordingly to the 
demands of the international climate and community at the time.
26
 Especial focus of this 
research is made on the core values. This thesis argues that if there were any principles that 
remained unchanged throughout the centuries of dramatic upheavals, it would indicate that 
they were the “exceptional principles” of Japanese diplomacy. They were not the ideas that 
were easily influenced by external forces which historians at times have favoured to describe 
as “gaiatsu.”27 That is, the unchanged principles were the most important creed of the 
Japanese state. They have constituted the “core” of Japanese internationalism and have 
historically driven the nature of Japanese international interaction.  
 
This thesis has a second aim. While internationalism is an ideology of international bonding, 
ironically, many of the present studies on internationalism are not truly international. Most of 
the existing researches done are West-centric.
28
 In other words, they have only looked at 
Euro-American figures, incidents and philosophy as their case studies.
29
 In fact, historians 
                                                          
25
 This idea was referenced from: Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan." Pyle has examined 
the ‘profound forces’ (referenced from A.J.P. Taylor) of Japanese diplomatic behaviour between 1945 and the 
1980s. Pyle points out WWII, the Occupation period (1945-1952), constructivism, and the international 
environment (especially America and China) as the main factors that have been shaping Japan’s international 
thoughts. The weakness of Pyle’s study is that he had only analysed the post-1945 era and not the Japanese 
history in longue duree. This thesis aims to do the unfinished task and supplement Pyle’s investigation.  
26
 Pyle, "Japan’s Historic Change of Course," 278. 
27
 The word Gaiatsu, literally “foreign pressure” or connotatively “pressures from outside” is often used by 
scholars to describe how Japan’s diplomacy has been passive and reactive only to foreign pressure. For more 
details, see, Yoichi Funabashi, ed. Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 
8-9. And; Mayumi Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan 
(New York: St. Martin’s Place, 1998). 5-11. 
28
 Examples of West-centric studies include the following: Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion 
and Accommodation ; Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Reform.; 
Martin Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).; F.S. 
Northedge, The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946 (Avon: Leicester University Press, 1986).; and 
Joshua Muravchik, The Future of the United Nations: Understanding the Past to Chart a Way Forward  
(Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 2005).  
29
 Akira Iriye, "Global History," in Palgrave Advances in International History, ed. Patrick Finney (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 320. Akira Iriye defines international history as “the history of international 
relations … [international history] studies how nations (both governments and citizens), presumably concerned 
with their ‘national interests,’ behave toward one another. The international arena tends to be seen as a stage for 
the interaction of particularly powerful countries, or the great powers.” Thus, based on his words, international 
history is not either European history or Euro-American history. Yet, at the same time, ones could argue that the 
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have tended to study the philosophical thought of figures such as Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel 
Kant, Karl Marx and Woodrow Wilson.
30
 Similarly, the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 and the 
establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and the United Nations in 1945 are the well-
referenced incidents.
31
 This trend connotes that the contributions from non-Western countries, 
including the ones from the Asia-Pacific, have not been given much attention, however. 
Evidently, the facts that five Asian countries had attended the Hague Conferences of 1899 
and 1907 and that Japanese officials played critical roles in the development of the League 
and UN frameworks have been largely disregarded from many of the published studies.
32
 I 
aim to therefore examine the history of internationalism as a truly international development 
by examining the Japanese view on the world as a non-Western example.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
word ‘international’ does not mean “West-East relations” or “West’s relations with non-West countries,” of 
course. Literally, the word ‘international’ means “connected with or involving two or more countries” according 
to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. However, I argue that, in the world of active globalization, the 
employment of the word “international” to refer to “Euro-American” relations is out-of-date. Especially since 
the twentieth century, the world has seen active interactions of countries of different civilizational background. 
The ‘Great Powers’ of the international community are no longer only the Western powers. Thus, I say the word 
‘international’ must be used only when a study has studied the relation amongst countries of different 
civilizational background. If an author only employs Euro-American case studies, it is not “international 
relations” but merely “Western relations.”  For the dictionary’s publication detail, see: Oxford University,  in 
Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
30
 Jeremy Bentham is often referenced for his coining of the term ‘international’ in 1780 to describe the relation 
between states. Immanuel Kant is famous for his book Toward Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and 
History in which he developed the idea of “unsociable sociability” of states and the need of ‘world republican’ 
governing body. Karl Marx employed the word ‘internationalism’ to describe the movement and struggle of 
working class on the international basis in 1850. Woodrow Wilson was the father of League of Nations in 1920 
which was the best example of political internationalism. These notes are from: Glenda Sluga, Lecture given at 
the University of Sydney, February - June 2011 2011. 
31
 Ibid. The Westphalia Treaty is understood to have created the norms on legal sovereignty and developed the 
thought on ‘universal peace’ for the first time in history. The League of Nations was the world’s first 
multinational organization that was created to oversee international relations and realize world peace. The UN 
was the successor of the League whose membership had become larger than the one of the League, is present 
today. In addition to them, the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), the Conference of Berlin (1884-85), and The 
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 are also popular case studies. In most cases, the Congress of Vienna is 
said to have outlined the “balance of power” order in Europe, regulated state relationships and significantly gave 
birth to the idea of ‘nation.’ At the Conference of Berlin, international law was developed as the ‘rule of the 
game.’ Lastly, the Hague Conferences were when countries of America, Europe and Asia first met and had 
discussions on war regulations. 
32
 Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, "New Histories of the United Nations," Journal of World History 19, no. 3 
(2008): 253-54. The history of the League of Nations tends to focus on the words and practices of the US 
President Woodrow Wilson and the British Secretary-General of the League Secretariat Sir Eric James 
Drummond. Furthermore, as the historians Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga point out, the history of the UN has 
often been written with a Eurocentric focus as well. The popular figures include the US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, his wife Eleanor, the British zoologist Julian Huxlery, the British scientist Joseph Needham, the 
French jurist Rene Cassin and the French anthropologist Alfred Metraux.  
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I have categorized the history of Japanese internationalism into three periods: 1853-1919, 
1919-1945 and 1945-2006.
33
 Each era starts and ends with a historically important event that 
marked certain changes in the essence of Japanese internationalism. The chapters below 
investigate the key incidents and figures in the respective period that played influential 
roles.
34
  
 
Chapter 2 examines the years of Japan’s opening to and interaction with the international 
community between 1853 and 1919.
35
 I investigate case studies such as the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868, The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the First World War of 1914-19. 
These incidents are analysed with respect to the words of the Meiji theorist Fukuzawa 
                                                          
33
 There are overlaps in the years of categorization simply because historical incidents did not happen 
accordingly to the years. For example, Chapter 3 examines 1919-1945 and Chapter 4 looks at 1945-2006. This 
is since the Second World War ended in August 1945. Between January and August 1945 is an important period 
of investigation in Chapter 3 as it is the ending months of the Pacific War, when Japan was undergoing social 
and diplomatic changes. Similarly, the period between August and December 1945 is also a significant era, as 
the US occupation of Japan started.  
34
 The following is the list of main primary sources. Japanese diplomacy is analysed based on the Diplomatic 
Bluebook the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which has been annually publishing since 1947. It outlines the basic 
keynotes of Japanese foreign policy and its problems, achievements and prospects. Diplomatic materials are 
available furthermore on the online database of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia of the University of 
Tokyo.  It has the manuscripts of the key treaties, speeches and such since the mid-eighteenth century. The 
journal articles and books written by the key figures – mainly Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nitobe Inazo and Yoshida 
Shigeru – are useful in tracing their worldviews. The series of online databases the UN, UNESCO, the Japan 
Broadcasting Company, the National Diet Library, and the Ministry of Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(MEXT) are useful in tracing the respective voices too. Further details are written in the footnotes of the 
opening section of each chapter and the bibliography in the end of the thesis. 
35
 The opening is often termed “the end of the Sakoku policy” in many texts. The term ‘Sakoku’ literally means 
‘chained-nation’ which refers to the isolationist policy that began under the Tokugawa regime began in 1633. 
The conservative government illegalized any contact with foreign influences. It banned religious activities, 
trading, and immigration of any kind because they saw foreign influences were ruining Japanese social order 
and traditions. The Tokugawa regime cut off its relations especially with Britain, Spain and France for their 
religious purposes to spread Christianity in Japan in which the government saw the potential of eradicating 
Shintoism as Japan’s national religion. The Dutch and Chinese were the only foreigners to be allowed to have 
contact with the Japanese yet only for trading under governmental supervision as they were said to have no 
religious ambitions. The Sakoku policy isolated the Japanese society from the external world until 1853 when 
the American commodore Matthew Perry’s “black ships” arrived at Japanese waters and forced the Tokugawa 
regime to open the country. For the historical study of Japan under the Sakoku policy, see: Itoh, Globalization of 
Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan ; Itoh, "Economic Myths Explained: Japan’s 
Abiding Sakoku Mentality."; Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds., Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa 
to Meiji (Princeton: Priceton University Press, 1986). 
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Yukichi, who proposed the Datsu-A Nyu-O (leave Asia, enter West) strategy as the national 
creed in the 1880s.
36
  
 
In Chapter 3, a series of diplomatic incidents between the Paris Peace Conference in January 
1919 and the Japanese defeat in August 1945 is investigated. I examine how the leaders and 
intellectuals perceived the ideal of Japanese internationalism by looking at two themes: (1) 
the Japan-League relations; and (2) the words and practices of Nitobe Inazo, who was the 
Under-Secretary General of the League of Nations Secretariat between 1920 and 1926. An 
examination of Nitobe’s careers reveals how he, who stood in between the West and the East, 
struggled to grant Japan the just role in the international community of Euro-American 
centrism.  
 
Chapter 4 looks at the post-1945 era. Through experiencing the traumatizing years of WWII, 
Japanese people were determined to revive the national creed with pacifist principles. The 
politician Yoshida Shigeru was the leading figure in this movement. As the Prime Minister of 
Japan in the immediate post-war era, his words and thoughts show how Japan as a state tried 
to redefine its place in the international community. I take the Japan-UN relation as a case 
study because the organization played a key role in the cultivation of the so-called Yoshida 
Doctrine which gave the sense of direction to the post-war Japanese statesmen.  
 
The Conclusion states the comprehensive implication of the history of Japanese 
internationalism from each chapter in regard to the aims of this thesis. It also discusses what 
                                                          
36
 Yukichi Fukuzawa, "Datsu-a-Ron,"  http://www.chukai.ne.jp/~masago/isa_datuaron.html.   
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this Japanese case could say about the development of internationalism as a thought in the 
international community and its future prospects.  
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Chapter 2: The Making of Early Japanese Internationalism, 1853 - 1919 
 
 
 
“Here I take antagonism to mean the unsociable sociability of human beings, that is, their 
tendency to enter into society, a tendency connected, however, with a constant resistance that 
continually threatens to break up this society.” 37  
– Immanuel Kant 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The history of Japanese internationalism begins in 1853. In this year, the American 
Commodore Matthew Perry entered Japanese waters and demanded the Tokugawa regime 
abandon isolationist policy.
38
 As a small Asian state, Japan had no choice but to open the 
country in front of the so-called gunboat diplomacy’s military pressure.39 The Tokugawa 
regime then signed a series of treaties with the Western powers such as America, Britain and 
France. The pacts established diplomatic relations and opened Japan’s ports to foreign traders. 
They marked Japan’s re-entry to the international community after nearly 260 years of 
isolation.
40
  
                                                          
37
 Immanuel Kant, Toward Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History, trans. David L. Colclasure 
(New York: Yale University Press, 2006). 6-7. 
38
 Kevin K. Doak, "Liberal Nationalism in Imperial Japan: the Dilemma of Nationalism and Internationalism," 
in Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World Citizenship ed. 
Dick Stegewerns (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 23. 
39
 Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan," 401. 
40
 Doak, "Liberal Nationalism in Imperial Japan: the Dilemma of Nationalism and Internationalism," 23. 
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Japan upon the opening was “politically immature, economically backward, and militarily 
impotent” in Western terms.41 The state was politically immature because the Tokugawa 
Government had basically banned any kind of contacts with foreign powers throughout the 
isolationist era. This policy resulted in Japanese officials to barely have diplomatic 
experiences for over 260 years. Japanese economy was also weak. As a state that had barely 
been exposed to the custom of international trading, the nation’s economic structure had no 
institution to incorporate foreign influences.
42
 Lastly, the military capability was impotent 
since Japan under the isolationist policy did not undergo any armed conflicts. Japanese 
soldiers thus hardly had the experience of actually fighting against foreign powers.  
 
For these reasons, the prime task for the Meiji Government, which replaced the Tokugawa 
regime in 1867-68 as Japan’s centralized administrative body, was to modernize the 
country’s backward aspects.43 Through developing national capability as strong as the ones of 
the Western powers, the Meiji leaders believed that they could defend Japan’s independence 
from the menace of Euro-American gunboat diplomacy. The Meiji Government thus 
proposed national slogans such as “catch up with the West, overtake the West,” Fukoku 
Kyohei (rich country, strong military) and Bunmei Kaika (Civilization and Enlightenment) in 
this era.
44
 The leaders glorified the acquisition of Western knowledge and technologies as 
Japanese people’s absolute obligation.  
                                                          
41
 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 until 
2000: 206. 
42
 Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan’s China Policy, 1924-1929: 26. The 
Japanese traded with the Dutch and the Chinese at Deshima, Nagasaki. But the trading was severely censored by 
the Tokugawa Government who did not want any foreign influences that had the potential of weakening their 
authoritarian governance.  
43
 Pyle, "Profound Forces in the Making of Modern Japan," 393. 
44
  ibid.; Mitoji Yabunaka, Kokka no Meiun [Fate of the Nation]  (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2010). 48-49.; and 
Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan’s China Policy, 1924-1929: 14. 
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The dynamics of the pro-Western version of internationalism that emerged in Japan in this 
period is best exemplified in the writings of the leading Meiji theorist and educator, 
Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). He was originally an intellectual who studied European 
philosophy of enlightenment in the 1850s. Fukuzawa then took part in both the Tokugawa 
and Meiji regimes as a governmental official in his late 20s, where he witnessed the transition 
of the Japanese state from a feudalist state to a modern empire himself. In this context, his 
texts generally discussed Japanese politics, governance and diplomacy. He, as a scholar, 
particularly explored the following two themes in his lifetime: (1) how Japan’s national 
development could be successfully carried out; and (2) how Japan’s independence as a 
sovereign state could be defended in the era of Western superiority.  
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Fukuzawa Yukichi and Japan upon Opening
45
 
 
 
 
Born on 10 January 1835, Fukuzawa Yukichi was brought up in a low-ranking, traditionally 
Japanese, samurai family in Nakatsu.
46
 He was a student of Chinese history and 
Confucianism in his youth, which were the most popular subjects in Tokugawa Japan.
47
 
Many sources imply that he never found them consequential.
48
 Fukuzawa especially 
questioned the principles of Confucianism which implanted the idea of hierarchical order in 
Japanese society. In such a structure, social class was one of the major determinants of one’s 
life career and status.
49
 Prior to the opening in the 1850s, the Japanese state was a feudalist 
and autocratic country. The royal family and the noble class had the authoritative power in 
governance, finance and military, and the peoples in the middle and low classes were barely 
given any freedom of choice. As a son of a low-class samurai, consequently, Fukuzawa 
underwent a series of social discriminations in his youth.
50
  
                                                          
45
 Three of his most important texts are the following: Fukuzawa, "Datsu-a-Ron".; Yukichi Fukuzawa, 
Gendaigo Yaku: Gakumon no Susume [Translated in Modern Japanese: An Encouragement of Learning] , trans. 
Takashi Saito (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2010).; and Yukichi Fukuzawa, Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu Vol.4 - 
Bunmeiron no Gairyaku [Outline of Theories of Civilization], ed. Masafumi Tomita and Tsuchihashi Shunichi 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969-1971). In all the writings, he explored Japan’s place in the world from political, 
social, cultural, diplomatic and economic perspectives. Moreover, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
translated by Kiyooka Eiichi, is a useful material in examining Fukuzawa’s inner thoughts. The publication 
detail is: Yukichi Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi  (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1960). 
For secondary sources, the following books are valuable: Takamori Hongou, Mernobu You, and Masahiro Inada, 
Kindai Nihon no Shisou [Modern Japanese Thought] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Shoten, 1979).; and Albert M. Craig, 
Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi  (Cambridge, MA: Havard University 
Press, 2009). Further studies are also done by historians such as Zhao Quansheng, Wakamiya Yoshibumi, 
Annete Schad-Seifert, Kevin M. Doak, Akira Iriye, and Carmen Blacker. See the Bibliography for further 
details.  
46
 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 1. Nakatsu was the name given to the Osaka region of 
today.   
47
 Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 8. 
48
 Hongou, You, and Inada, Kindai Nihon no Shisou [Modern Japanese Thought] 152-53. 
49
 E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji 
Period  (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). 13. 
50
 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 179. He reviews that “Born as I was in a family of low 
rank, I recall being always discontent with the things I had to endure.” 
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In questioning Japanese societies and traditions, Fukuzawa moved to Nasagaki in 1854 for 
further studies.
51
 As an ambitious individual striving to change the paradigm of Japanese 
society, he chose Nagasaki as his destination. The period was when the wave of 
Westernization was significantly flowing into Japanese societies upon Matthew Perry’s 
arrival in 1853. Western ideas such as democracy, enlightenment, and industrialization were 
introduced one after another to Japanese people. And Nagasaki was famous for the stationing 
of Dutch settlers and as the only place in Japan where people could be legally exposed to 
Western culture and knowledge under the isolationist rule.
52
 Fukuzawa studied the 
implications of social governance from Western perspectives at the port city.
53
 
 
Fukuzawa stayed in Nagasaki until 1858 and worked on writing his thesis Isshin Dokuritsu 
no Te-ze [The Thesis on Complete Independence].
54
 He also worked as a translator to make a 
living.
55
 As a student of humanity, he was mostly responsible of translating academic books 
on history, economy and politics.
56
 This job brought Fukuzawa into contact with the literature 
from English-speaking countries such as England, Scotland and America.
57
 He particularly 
enjoyed examining the texts written by Scottish intellectuals who played roles in the Scottish 
Enlightenment movement in the 1700s – such as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar 
and John H. Burton.
58
 These texts were said to have developed the sense of “modernity” in 
Fukuzawa’s understanding of world affairs.  
                                                          
51
 Hongou, You, and Inada, Kindai Nihon no Shisou [Modern Japanese Thought] 152-53. 
52
 Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 8. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
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55
 Craig, Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 3. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid., 11, 13, 26, 58. 
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In 1858, Fukuzawa moved to Edo and served the Tokugawa Government which was failing 
to conclude a fair treaty with the Americans.
59
 This appointment granted Fukuzawa the 
chance to witness Japan’s place in the world himself. The reality was harsh: he saw the 
Tokugawa officials occasionally backing down to the American negotiators. This was mostly 
because the Japanese state in the 1850s was industrially underdeveloped. It stood no chance 
in pushing back the Western power militarily and diplomatically.
60
 In this context, the 
Tokugawa regime signed a number of the so-called ‘unfair treaties’ with the West. 61 One of 
the most well-known treaties was the Convention of Kanagawa in which Japan recognized 
American ascendancy in trade and diplomacy.
62
 The frustrating outcome made Fukuzawa 
realize that Japan was under the immediate necessity of “modernizing” its national strength in 
order to defend its sovereignty.
63
 Yet, at this moment, he was still unsure of what 
‘modernization’ exactly meant.  
 
In 1862, at age twenty-seven, Fukuzawa travelled to America and Europe as an interpreter of 
the Tokugawa Government’s mission for the further learning of Western technologies and 
studies.
64
 The travel granted him the opportunity to re-organize his understanding of 
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 Hongou, You, and Inada, Kindai Nihon no Shisou [Modern Japanese Thought] 152-53. For more, see: 
Michael R. Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
60
 Hongou, You, and Inada, Kindai Nihon no Shisou [Modern Japanese Thought] 152-53.  
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on the principle of unfair treaties, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970).  
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  For the original text, see: Yale Law School - Lillian Goldman Law Library, "Japanese-American Diplomacy - 
Treaty of Kanagawa,"  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/japan002.asp. 
63
 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 187.He reviews that: “I disliked the bureaucratic, 
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modernity and to re-recognize the Western superiority.
65
 In America and Europe, he 
witnessed the West’s advanced institutions in many fields, such as in economy, military and 
law. In his book Bunmei Ron no Gairyaku [the Outline of Theories of Civilization], for 
instance, he commented on Western philosophy of international law that was “loose and 
easily circumvented, yet it somewhat reduces the likelihood of war” and “all of these 
increasingly detailed and extensive regulations are conducive to a better moral order.”66 In 
addition to his studies of the West, this experience made Fukuzawa assure that Japan’s 
modernization campaign must be based on Western institutions. He was then certain that the 
Western ideas were the world’s most advanced knowledge that would make Japanese 
development an effective and up-to-dated mission.  
 
Fukuzawa’s worldview is best exemplified in his Datsu-A-Ron article [DAR]. The text was 
published in the newspaper Jiji Shimpo [literally, Current Events] in March 1885 with the 
purpose to inform the need for Westernization to as many people as possible.
67
 In the article, 
Fukuzawa went to discuss: (1) his perception of “Japan in the world” and (2) his suggestions 
to the Meiji Government to adopt Westernization as Japan’s future path.  
 
The text firstly outlined that the world was divided into three camps of civilization: Japan, the 
West and Asia. Simply put, the word ‘West’ in Fukuzawa’s texts was used to refer to the 
most advanced nations in the international community. While he did not clearly point out the 
                                                          
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Ibid.Craig referenced the quote from: Fukuzawa, Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu Vol.4 - Bunmeiron no Gairyaku 
[Outline of Theories of Civilization]: 113.  
67
 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 225. Datsu-A-Ron literally means “The Theory of 
Leaving Asia.” Some historians have translated it as “Good-bye Asia,” “de-Asianization,” “escape from Asia,” 
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I have referenced the English translated version of the DAR article from: Dwight Tat Wai Kwok, "A Translation 
of Datsu-A-Ron: Decoding a Pre-War Japanese Nationalistic Theory" (University of Toronto 2009).  
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countries by name, Fukuzawa yet connoted that the ‘West’ was the ideal being of nationhood 
that Japanese people should see as the target of their national development process:
 68
 
My noble Japanese country men, it is our principle to recognize the need of the country 
over the weight of the government. Through the reliance of the Imperial Household’s 
dignity, we shall overthrow the old government and establish a new one. Everyone in the 
country shall completely adopt the modern Western civilization. (It is from doing so) Not 
only that Japan may strip away its old self, it will create a new axle in the entire continent 
of Asia … 69 
 
Fukuzawa used the word ‘Asia’ to refer to uncivilized states. Unlike in the Western case, he 
clearly highlighted China and Korea by name. Despite the political, religious and traditional 
closeness, Fukuzawa maintained that “differences in heredity and education” existed between 
Japan and the two parties and that “China and Korea are more different than similar to us.”70 
He analyzed that the major causes of the Qing Dynasty’s decline in the mid-1850s were the 
Dynasty’s stubbornness to continue worshiping Confucianism as their national creed and 
denial to accept the British superiority. For Fukuzawa who especially believed in the need for 
modernization and review of old traditions, China and Korea therefore stood out as the most 
‘uncivilized’ states.  
 
In between these two blocs was the Japanese nation which had just opened itself to the world. 
He did not identify Japan with either Asia or the West. Fukuzawa in the DAR text warned that 
Japan would become one of the ‘Asian’ countries if the authorities and the people took no 
action: 
                                                          
68
 Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi: 214-15. He wrote: “From my own observation in both 
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It is our best strategy to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with the civilized 
nations of the West. As for our approach to the treating of China and Korea, there shall be 
no special treatment just because they are our neighbouring countries. Simply adapt the 
ways of the Westerners is sufficed.
71
 (sic) 
 
Fukuzawa implored that the Meiji Government must lead the country to the direction of a 
“catch up with the West” consensus. Through doing so, he believed that Japan could defend 
its sovereignty and even become one of the “Western powers.” In addition to serving as an 
advisor of the Meiji Government, Fukuzawa as an educator then established a number of 
schools in the 1880s and 1890s.
 72
 He trained his countrymen in the ways of thinking that he 
believed would enable Japan to resist the foreign threat.  
     
Fukuzawa’s pro-Western ideology was revolutionary in mid-nineteenth century Japan in two 
ways. First, as the historian Harold C. Hinton has commented, most Asian states, including 
Japan prior to the opening in the 1850s, had long seen themselves as the “vassals of the 
Chinese Empire.”73 For over years and centuries, the Asian states had recognized China as the 
center of the Asian civilization.
74
 Hence, Fukuzawa’s proposal that denied the historical 
tradition was indeed innovative. Second, the idea to follow the West as the role-model was 
groundbreaking as well.
75
 Under the Sakoku policy that had isolated the country for over 260 
years, their knowledge of Western affairs was critically limited. As the existence of the word 
Nanbanjin back then showed, Japanese society had commonly seen Europeans and Americans 
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as ‘strangers’ and/or ‘barbarians.’76 Therefore, Fukuzawa’s DAR proposal implored that the 
Japanese state and people should follow the ‘strangers’ and abandon the ‘patron.’  
 
For these reasons, Fukuzawa’s idea was very unprecedented, but was yet cogent as well. 
Without the incorporation of Western institutions, it was obvious that Japan would not be able 
to survive the era of imperialism, as seen in how the Qing Dynasty who tried to keep its 
isolation had declined following the Opium War in the early 1840s.
77
 Whether right or wrong, 
Fukuzawa’s Datsu-A Nyu-O suggestion had certainly convinced the Meiji Government 
leaders to accelerate the course of the Westernization campaign in order to defend Japan from 
the foreign strangers. In this regard, his doctrine marked the first turning point in the history 
of Japanese internationalism. The Datsu-A Nyu-O rhetoric gave the sense of direction to the 
Japanese state that was lost in the international community. The policy, however, had left the 
general public and anti-Western authorities in uncertainty.  
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Question of National Identity: Traditionalism, Westernism, Pan-Asianism and 
Nationalism 
 
 
 
Westernization then became the Japanese Empire’s national consensus of development under 
the Meiji Government’s leadership.78 The regime reformed the country’s social, economic 
and military structures one after another based on Euro-American ideas.
79
 As part of the 
campaign, the Meiji Government abolished the feudal institution and established Western-
style governance. The new order was characterized by centralization of political authority and 
a Prussian-style monarchical rule.
80
 Such an administrative transition was one of the 
processes that the Meiji leaders believed was necessary in turning Japan into a ‘civilized’ 
state.
81
 By establishing “modern” institutions, they believed that Japan could be “modernized,” 
thus national independence could be secured. This series of transitions was called the Meiji 
Restoration that began in 1868.  
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The shift was nonetheless not a straightforward process for the Meiji leaders.
82
 The greatest 
difficulty was the gap between their and the general public’s perception of a “nation” and 
“international community.” On one hand, the Meiji leaders who had travelled overseas had 
acknowledged the reality that “Japan” was one of the “nations” in the “international 
community.” They had seen “foreign nations” such as Prussia, Britain and America. The 
perception of the general public was nevertheless different. For the mass, the word “nation” 
[kuni] applied not to “Japan” but to the Han domains.83 The greatest cause for this 
consciousness of the mass was the Tokugawa regime’s isolationist policy. Under the Sakoku 
governance, the general public was never exposed to foreign cultures, peoples and influences. 
The vast majority of the mass thus had no concept of “Japan” and the “international 
community” in the way the government elites who had seen the “world.”84  
 
For these reasons, the Meiji government’s idea to justify Westernization as the way to defend 
the “Japanese nation” from “the threat of foreign menace” was not an effective idea in uniting 
the “Japanese people” as a national entity. The general public, in the first place, had not 
understood the words “West,” the “Japanese nation,” “foreign” and “menace” in the way the 
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leaders had. The first challenge for the new leaders was thus to develop the sense of national 
solidarity and international mind amongst the mass. This attempt was best exemplified in the 
Meiji elites’ drafting of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan.  
 
Constitution was one of the factors that the Meiji leaders saw as the symbol of modernity 
during their missions in Europe and America.
85
 They saw that the Great Powers of the 
international community, such as Britain, Prussia and America, all possessed their own 
constitution that outlined their philosophy of nationhood and had given its people a sense of 
national unity.
86
 For example, the US Constitution highlighted “liberty” as its national 
slogan.
87
 The Meiji leaders thus saw the necessity to make a Japanese constitution that 
proposed national slogans, so that the sense of national unity would be cultivated in Japan as 
well.
88
  
 
With this intention, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was issued in February 1889. It 
introduced a Prussian-model system of constitutional governance.
89
 The Constitution placed 
the Emperor as the head of state and government; and the Imperial Diet [teikoku gikai] as the 
head institution of administration.
90
 The politician Itoh Hirobumi was the leading figure in the 
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drafting of the constitution.
91
 He adopted the Prussian model for the many historical and 
political similarities the state shared with the Japanese nation.
92
 For example, both countries 
had a long tradition of monarchical rule with the Emperor as the head of state. Moreover, the 
two parties were also in the process of national transition in the 1880s. Prussia under 
Bismarck was seeking to unify the Germanic states in Central Europe. The Japanese state was 
also attempting to reorganize the feudal, domain system from the Tokugawa period.
93
 In other 
words, Itoh found the Prussian model a helpful example to see how the advanced country of 
the West was attempting to unite its peoples under a new framework of national entity.  
 
In addition to the adoption of the Western principles, the Imperial Constitution also had 
outlined the creeds of Shintoism. Article 1, as reads as follows, was the best example: “The 
Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages 
eternal.”94 One of the Shinto principles was the glorification of the Emperor as the national 
symbol and spiritual sovereign. The Emperor, as the historian Maruyama Masao explains, 
was believed to create “norms from scratch” and that “absolute values [of life] are embodied 
in the person of the Emperor himself.”95 This belief had been the absolute consensus of 
Japanese people, regardless of which Samurai domain (Bakufu) was in charge of national 
administration.
96
 In other words, the Emperor was the determinant that had unified the 
Japanese people as one entity throughout history. Itoh and his colleagues, while advocated 
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Westernization of Japanese institutions, thus decided to keep the Shinto teachings in the 
Constitution. This strategy had the intention to maintain the sense of ‘solidarity’ amongst 
Japanese society. As historians often point out, the leaders of this era were most afraid of the 
Japanese archipelago from splitting into many small states and losing the solidarity as one 
national entity.
97
  They had seen how the Qing Dynasty had begun to decline in the 1840s 
partially owing to its loss of national solidarity, which let the Western empires to divide the 
country up into many fragmented pieces.
98
 Therefore, the Imperial Constitution reflected both 
the traditional and Western principles in order to maintain the Japanese solidarity while 
urging the people to accelerate the course of Westernization.  
 
The Meiji leaders, nonetheless, could not achieve the aim. The series of dramatic 
reconstruction of Japanese institutions during the years of the Meiji Restoration confused the 
vast majority of the public thoroughly.
99
 The new constitution, for instance, altered the 
Emperor’s role as the spiritual figure of Japanese society which had been the traditional 
dogma of the state for over six centuries. The Emperor then became, in addition to the 
spiritual role, the head of state with the absolute authority to lead the Diet, military, 
bureaucracy and justice.
100
 The reformation of the Emperor’s status puzzled the public 
because, as Maruyama describes, it was the “unification of administration and laws” and the 
“unification of the sources of dispensation and deprivation.”101 Most importantly, the 
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members of the Imperial Family were educated to become the ‘symbol of the Japanese state’ 
and were not trained to ‘lead’ the nation. The vast majority of them had no experience or 
educational background in politics, diplomacy and war.
102
 The gap between practicability and 
tradition confused the mass, especially in the sense of whom to trust for national leadership in 
the era of radical changes. This confusion resulted in splitting the nation into factions of 
different political thought, after all. 
 
One of the factions was consisted of the people who regarded the Government’s application 
of Western ideas as a self-benefiting policy. The Jiyu Minken Undo [Movement for People’s 
Free Rights] that began in 1874 under the leadership of Itagaki Taisuke was the most notable 
movement.
103
 This group saw that the Meiji leaders’ handling of Westernization was done 
only to serve the elites’ convenience. Itagaki pointed out that the Meiji Government had 
adopted Western thoughts such as industrialization, constitutional regime and monarchism, 
but did not introduce the ones for the general public’s good like democracy, civil rights and 
freedom of speech.
104
 This faction protested against the Government while the elites were 
drafting the Imperial Constitution in the mid-1870s.
105
 The movement continued until the late 
1890s. In response to the uprising, the Government issued the Imperial Constitution in 1899 
with the clause to open the Teikoku Gikai [the Imperial Diet] as a place for the people from 
the general public to have a say in the policymaking process.
106
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This era also saw a consecutive establishment of many Pan-Asianist and nationalist lobby 
groups. The people in this movement disliked the Government’s idealization of and obsession 
with the West itself. They called for the Meiji authorities to think high of regional unity and 
return to the traditional way of being. Thinkers such as Okakura Takeshi and Okubo 
Toshimichi were the leading figures in the Pan-Asian and anti-Western movements. Okakura 
proposed the slogan “Ajia wa Hitotsu” [literally, Asia is One] and called for Asian 
solidarity.
107
 Similarly, Okubo founded the Koa-Kai [the Society for Raising Asia] in 
1880.
108
 An extreme figure was the Japanese journalist and historian Soho Tokutomi. He was 
a radical advocate of Pan-Asianism and urged the Meiji Government to declare the “Asian 
Monroe Doctrine” in the early 1900s.109 The extremist argued that “the fate of Asia must be 
decided by Asians” and the West should be thus expulsed from Asia.110  
 
The historian Ikegami Eiko’s observation that the Japanese state in this era was trapped in the 
dilemma of whether to respect “practical nationhood” or “spiritual nationhood” best describes 
the dynamics.
111
 The pro-Western policymakers and intellectuals were certain that 
Westernization was in practice the most effective way to defend the nation from foreign 
threats from their experiences studying overseas.
 112
 However, the conservatives and the mass 
found the pro-Western policy as a violation of Japan’s spiritual belief and historical 
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conventions.
113
 This led to the consecutive outbreak of civil wars between the two blocs – 
such as Boshin War (1868-69) and the Satsuma Rebellion (1877).
114
 
 
Yet, interestingly, Japan did not undergo any era of national partition despite the social 
uncertainties and military uprisings, like America did during its civil war between 1861 and 
1865. The most widely accepted explanation for this situation was the force of nationalism.
115
 
The doctrine of nationalism was indeed a new idea for the Japanese. As discussed before, for 
over many centuries, Japanese people regarded themselves as the citizens of the Han domain 
they lived in, and not of the “nation” of Japan. Nonetheless, the rapid inflow of Western 
influences changed this custom. The arrival of Perry and the inflow of ‘non-Tokugawa’ and 
‘non-Edo’ influences then urged Japanese society to develop the concept of “foreigners,” 
meaning “non-Tokugawa/Edo peoples,” for the first time in history after the 260 years of 
isolation.
116
 The idea of nationalism then rapidly developed throughout the rest of the 
nineteenth century. With the Meiji Government’s issuing of the Constitution of “Empire of 
Japan,” the mass then started to recognize itself as “Japanese” citizens and that a state called 
“Japan” in the “world” had existed.117 Therefore, the era between 1853 and the early 1890s 
was the period when the Japanese people developed the senses of “national unity” and 
“internationality” in Western terms. Yet, this did not mean, as this section has examined, the 
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nation was completely unified. The factions of different ideologies on Japanese state-building 
continued to exist and challenge the pro-Western Meiji Government.  
 
 
As a Rising Empire: Japan’s Quest for Honour, 1890s – 1919 
 
 
 
By the early 1890s, the Meiji modernization in the domestic sphere was reaching the 
proposed standard of development.
118
 The state’s grand strategy was hence no longer to 
prioritize industrialization and the “catch up with the West” campaign. In this period, the 
Government redefined the national objective as to “overtake the West.” Precisely, it stated 
the obtainment of a great power status so that they could overthrow the series of ‘unfair 
treaties’ the Tokugawa regime had signed in the 1850s.119 The leaders wanted to inform the 
world, especially the Western counterparts, that Japan was no longer a savage state in the Far 
East, but was a civilized power with modern institutions and international mind.
120
 The 
governmental leaders believed Japan was ready for a respected title after the intense years of 
modernization. 
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This period saw many of Japan’s military and diplomatic attempts and struggles in pursuing 
the objective.
121
 The leaders especially saw that military success was “the single most 
important part of the standard argument that Japan had become or was becoming a great 
nation.”122 Seeing the Western counterparts such as Britain, France and America, had 
developed their national strength by winning wars, the Japanese Government believed that 
Japan should follow suit.
123
 The building of diplomatic strength was considered as an 
important part of modernization as well. The Japanese saw that the Great Powers of the West 
had reinforced their military strength by forming alliances and writing treaties that defined 
their diplomatic ranking in the international community.
124
 The leaders of Japan decided to 
work on them too.  
 
The Japanese campaign began with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which Japan 
gained Taiwan as its first overseas colony in the aftermath. The war served two purposes for 
the Japanese. First, the victory over Asia’s power might, the Qing Dynasty, meant that the 
Japanese empire was then the most powerful state in the region.
125
 Second, the acquisition of 
Taiwan turned the Japanese state into a colonial empire just like how the Great Powers of the 
international community were.
126
 The Japanese Government then started to modernize 
Taiwan in order to show the West that Japan was modernized enough to enlighten other 
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peoples. The leaders wanted to emphasize that Japan could share the burden of the ‘civilized’ 
states along with the Western empires.
127
 
 
Although historians rarely discuss the Japanese presence, the Hague Peace Conference of 
1899 was the first multilateral conference attended by Japan in history. Japan was one of the 
five Asian countries at the Hague conference.
128
 The Japanese delegate, being basked in the 
afterglow of the triumph in 1895, headed to the Netherlands with jubilation.
129
 Government 
officials back in Tokyo and the delegate both saw the Conference, where the Great Powers of 
the international community all participated, as a great opportunity to elevate its international 
status.
130
 The Japanese delegate’s chief objective was therefore to make contributing 
suggestions and inform the Western counterparts that Japan was ready to respect the 
principles of international law along with the civilized nations of the West.
131
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The Japanese representatives, however, failed to achieve the noblesse oblige.
132
 The Japanese 
delegate was in great confusion at the conference because they had been never exposed to 
Western-style and multilateral conventions before. The representatives spent most of their 
time observing how Western politics worked.
 133
 They could not make meaningful 
suggestions that convinced the Western representatives to see Japan as a ‘modern’ power. 
The Japanese delegate thus had “no objection to the project of [a] convention for the 
mediation and arbitration as mentioned … provided however that all the continental powers 
do likewise.”134 Similarly, the German delegate Alexander von Siebold described the 
Japanese officials that they were “entering the European diplomatic concert … (as it were) 
through the backdoor.”135 The Government leaders back in Tokyo thus saw the Japanese 
participation in the Hague Conference with “considerable disappointment.”136 In fact, none of 
the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers in this era mentioned the Conference in their 
policy speeches.
137
  
 
The Japanese struggle at The Hague in 1889 implied that Japanese policymakers were not 
ready yet to incorporate multilateral bonds in their diplomatic agenda. Bilateralism was still 
the mainstream type of bonding the Japanese sought to develop. The Japanese involvement in 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 implied such a 
Japanese state of affairs.  
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The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 marked the end of Japan’s diplomatic 
isolation in the international community.
138
 In the closing decade of the nineteenth century, 
the emergence of the Dual and the Triple Alliances had put the secluded Japanese (and the 
British) state in a disadvantageous situation.
139
 The intervention of Russia, Germany and 
France against Japan at the close of the Sino-Japanese War in April 1895 forced the Japanese 
to relinquish their interests in China.
140
 This incident alerted the Japanese to the significance 
of alliance in the pursuit of national interests. The alliance with Britain in 1902 was hence a 
remarkable phenomenon for the Japanese. The partnership did not only grant Japan a ‘first-
class’ ally that strengthened its diplomatic and military position in the international 
community.
141
 The Japanese state under the leadership of the Prime Minister Katsura Taro 
also regarded that the treaty with Britain indicated that the West had finally recognized Japan 
as a civilized state.
142
 History had shown that the act of negotiating, signing and practicing 
alliances only occurred amongst the Great Powers; and never between a Great Power and an 
uncivilized state. Backward countries were rather the subjects for colonialism.  Katsura and 
his successors saw the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a symbol of Western recognition that 
Japan had then become a civilized power.
143
  
 
The Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 had an exceptional effect on the redefinition of Japanese 
internationalism. In addition to Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula, the triumph 
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urged the Japanese leaders to re-think of their understanding of ‘Westernization’ and 
‘modernization.’144 Prior to 1905, the Japanese authorities understood two words as the same 
idea.
145
 This tendency reflected how the two concepts were introduced to Japanese societies 
in the 1850s. As we have seen in Fukuzawa’s literature, the Meiji Government regarded 
Western ideas as the “most modernized school of thought.” In other words, the word ‘West’ 
did not refer to any specific country, but to “the group of Western nations” in general as the 
utopian symbol of enlightenment. As a matter of fact, the key figures prior to 1905 had rarely 
specified which country the word “West” exactly referred to.  
 
The victory in 1905 then slowly changed the understanding. The Japanese forces defeated the 
Russians (or the ‘West’) who were once believed to be so highly modernized that Japan 
would stand no chance of defeating. The Japanese leaders then began to distinguish the 
concepts of “Westernization” from “Modernization” and treat them as different perceptions 
for the first time in history.
146
 The figures in the post-1905 years started stating Western 
countries by name in their speeches. For example, Katsura who led Japan to conclude the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and achieve victory in the Russo-Japanese War gave a speech at the 
National Diet on 21 January 1909; 
Now our diplomatic relations with the Teimei Rekkoku [the Great Powers] are becoming more 
friendly, especially with Britain – and through having the United States as the intervener [in 
concluding the Russo-Japanese War], the Russo-Japanese relations are getting better too. We 
aim to have no misunderstandings [with the Great Powers] and we are now even more 
determined to defend the Peace in the East.
147
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This alteration seen in the expression of world affairs implied that the Japanese authorities 
had slowly begun to consolidate their understanding of modernity with more vivid and 
concrete norms. The general term ‘West’ was no longer used as frequently as before. The 
more specific notions such as ‘Britain’ and ‘America’ started to occupy more spaces in the 
Japanese understanding of modernity.
148
 The “bonds” the diplomatic policymakers aimed to 
make in the coming years, thus, began to particularly concentrate on the ones with the ‘truly 
advanced’ countries of the West.  
 
In 1907, Japan attended the Second Peace Conference at The Hague. The Japanese delegate 
was led by Tsuzuki Keiroku.
149
 At the opening session of the Conference, Tsuzuki clearly 
outlined Japan’s ambition to be recognized as a Great Power, particularly from the “most 
advanced countries” in the world. He called for the Western powers to see his country “with 
admirable tact and dignity” and equal to the French or the English.150 With the victory against 
Russia, Tsuzuki believed that Japan then had the right to be finally treated as a first-class 
citizen of the international community. For these reasons, the Japanese delegate engaged in 
the discussions actively and sought to make meaningful comments. Tsuzuki was determined 
not to repeat the mistake their predecessors made at the Convention of 1899.
151
  
                                                          
148
 Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan’s China Policy, 1924-1929: 28. 
149
 Muntarbhorn, "The 1899 Hague Peace Conference and the Development of the Laws of War: Asia's 
Contribution to the Quest for Humanitarianism?," 113. The delegate for the 1907 convention was consisted of: 
Tsuzuki Keiroku (diplomat), Sato Yoshimaro (diplomat), Terauchi Masatake (General of the Japanese Imperial 
Army), Saito Makoto (General of the Japanese Imperial Navy, later the Prime Minister (1932-34)). Tsuzuki was 
born on 17 February 1861. He studied at the University of Berlin in 1882 as a student sent by the Meiji 
Government. He entered MOFA in 1886. He served as an assistant officer at the Japanese embassy at Russia. 
For more, see: National Diet Library, "Tsuzuki Keiroku kankei bunsho [Documents on Tsuzuki Keiroku]," 
National Diet Library, http://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/kensei/entry/tsudukikeiroku.php.  
150
 Schlichtmann, "Japan, Germany and the Idea of the Hague Peace Conferences," 390. Quote from: James 
Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1909). For more, see also: A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences and Other 
International Conferences concerning the Laws and Usages of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1909). 
151
 Schlichtmann, "Japan, Germany and the Idea of the Hague Peace Conferences," 390.  
Page 44 of 125 
 
Japan then entered the First World War in Asia in August 1914. The terms of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902 imposed upon the Japanese the responsibility to “help their ally 
when hostilities broke out.”152 As the historians Burkman and Pyle have commonly argued, 
the Japanese leaders had regarded the war as a great chance to pursue the obtainment of a 
great power status.
153
 The wartime Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu gave a speech to the 
National Diet on 5 September 1914, roughly after a week after the nation’s participation in 
the war; 
… in order to protect the Perpetual Peace in the East, the [Japanese] Empire has decided to 
declare war on Germany. We, along with the citizens of our Allied nations, believe in sincere 
justice and fair attitudes … I believe that war for the maintenance of peace is our people’s 
common wish [that there would no disagreements].  Hence, the Government … believes in the 
immediate need for a military action …154  
 
As seen in Okuma’s words, the Japanese Government showed no hesitation in participating in 
the Great War. He even declared that the entry into WWI was what the “common wish” of 
Japanese society. The Japanese forces then fought the German army in Chinese cities.
155
 
Through defeating another European power in a war, the Japanese authorities believed that 
Japan’s international status as a modernized, first-class power in the international community 
would be solidified furthermore.
156
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So in the end we find ourselves possible to affirm that the Japanese state’s objective in this 
era was to actively engage in international politics and obtain a respected title in the world. 
The political leaders, diplomats and intellectuals had commonly seen the West as an ideal 
state of nationhood and believed that Japan, as an underdeveloped state, had to catch up with 
them as quickly as possible. In this regard, the international bonds the Japanese authorities 
purposed to establish in this period were largely West-orientated. They did not pay much 
attention to the rest of the world. Asia was by large considered a backward region where 
Japan, as a Great Power, was obliged to conquest, colonize and enlighten. Thus, while 
Japanese authorities saw the world as a tri-polar concert – the West, Asia and Japan – they 
clearly ranked their importance hierarchically.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to see the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 with critical importance. The Japanese Government saw with 
the “Wilsoanian” ideas would allow Japan to obtain recognition as a first-class citizen without any 
discriminative notions.  
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Chapter 3: Japanese Internationalism in the Era of the League of Nations, 
1919-1945 
 
 
 
“Men live peacefully as long as their old way of life is maintained and there is no change in 
customs.”157 
 – Niccolo Machiavelli 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This chapter explores the development of Japanese internationalism with primary emphasis 
on Japan-League relations. It argues that the idealization of the West continued to be the most 
fundamental drive of the Japanese diplomatic bonding. The Government strived to play 
contributing roles at Geneva in order to develop a great power status. Such an ambition, 
nonetheless, faced many difficulties. As seen in the Japanese withdrawal from the League of 
Nations in 1933, the two parties failed to cultivate corresponding interests. The rise of 
nationalist and Pan-Asianist leaders in the early 1930s then turned Japanese internationalism 
into an ultranationalist and militarist ideology. WWII in Asia then broke out in December 
1941. It signified the fall of pro-Western internationalism that the Japanese figures had 
cultivated since 1853. 
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The question of national identity continued to divide Japan’s political sphere into the two 
opposing philosophical factions.
158
 The pro-Western figures of this era, such as Uchida 
Kousai and Shidehara Kijuro, believed in Fukuzawa’s Datsu-A Nyu-O (Leave Asia, enter 
West) rhetoric. They proposed peaceful coexistence with Western powers and advocated 
Japan’s membership in the League of Nations.159 On the other hand, the authorities of the 
Pan-Asian and nationalist bloc, led by Tanaka Giichi, Matsuoka Yosuke and Tojo Hideki, 
were sceptical of the pro-Western foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson’s rejection of Japan’s 
racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was especially influential. 
They developed an anti-Western sentiment and criticized the League as a ‘manipulated’ arena 
that favoured the conveniences of the Western states.
160
  
 
For many observers, the interwar period is a byword for the League’s failure and 
humiliation.
161
 The organization’s inability to solve the ‘German problem’ and the outbreak 
of WWII in September 1939 is often exemplified.
162
 This thesis yet shows that there is 
another side of history. That is, the fact that intellectuals were putting the effort in the making 
of international peace behind the scene. Their struggles and achievements are best traceable 
in the practices and thoughts of the Japanese agricultural economist, author and scholar 
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Nitobe Inazo.
163
 As an individual who had spent his youth in international environments, 
Nitobe knew the difficulty of developing intercultural understanding himself. He anticipated 
the interchange of the East (i.e. Japan) and the West (i.e. America, Britain, etc.) at Geneva 
would have the great potential for diplomatic turmoil. His career as the Under-Secretary 
General of the League Secretariat (1920-1926) was thus a challenge to construct a bridge 
between the parties of different civilizational background.
164
  
  
 
Contrasting Interests: Japan and the West at Paris and Geneva 
 
 
 
The Japanese state was the “odd man out” in the international community of this period.165 
Japan was exceptional because, in the first place, it was identified by the West and by its own 
community as not a Western state. The cultural, religious and geographical Asian state’s 
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participation in the West-centric community then began to slowly challenge the West-centric 
perception of international politics.
166
   
 
The main objectives of the Japanese delegate at the Paris Peace Conference (PPC) were: (1) 
the removal of the West’s racist thoughts on non-Western peoples; and (2) the consolidation 
of Japan’s great power status.167 The race question was essential for the elites because, most 
importantly, being ‘Asian’ was not regarded as being ‘civilized’ in the international arena of 
this era.
168
 In other words, the Social Darwinist world order indicated that the Japanese 
empire would not be recognized as a “Great Power” for its ‘Asian’ identity. Moreover, the 
West’s racist worldviews, as illustrated in America’s of anti-immigration movement and the 
White Australia Policy that legally ratified racial discrimination, had then influenced the 
Japanese public to grow anti-Western sentiments.
169
 Baron Makino Nobuaki of the Japanese 
delegate thus gave a speech at Paris and called for the principle of racial equality: 
 
The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting 
Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members to extend 
League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on 
account of their race or nationality.
170
  
 
Through this proposal, Makino aimed to ease his home country’s domestic frustration and 
realize Japan’s national creed of obtaining a great power status. In addition, as the leading 
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Japanese diplomat of the interwar time Ishii Kikujiro had pointed out, by the word “equality” 
the Japanese Government did not mean  
 
… in point of wealth, natural resources and military strength … What Japan has insisted upon, 
what she still insists upon, is that she shall not be made the objective of discrimination and 
derogatory treatment by any of the nations with whom she has relations.
171
   
 
The grand objective of the Japanese Government and delegate at the Conference was thus to 
cultivate the consensus of sovereign equality amongst the Great Powers. The Japanese 
challenge, nonetheless, faced three obstacles at Paris and Geneva that prevented the Japanese 
desire from coming true.  
 
First, the Western representatives declined Japan’s racial equality proposal at Paris. The 
American, British and Australian delegates were especially against the idea.
172
 These powers 
were the advocates of the Social Darwinist doctrines so to defend their national interests.
173
 
For example, Woodrow Wilson justified the US colonization of the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and Guam as ‘civilizing missions’ that would enlighten the indigenous populations.174 
The West’s decline made the Japanese delegate sceptical about the Geneva order.175 While 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points stated “equality among the peoples of the world” as one of the chief 
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principles, such an idea was only applied in Euro-American contexts in reality.
176
 This 
international climate critically disappointed the Japanese. The decline influenced the 
Japanese leaders to see as if the West was ganging up on Japan to undermine the non-
Western power’s desire to obtain a great power status.177  
 
Second, the different experiences the parties underwent in WWI caused their main interests at 
Paris to differ.
178
 On one hand, the Great War was an “event unprecedented in the sheer scale 
of its destruction” that “extinguished millions of lives and caused untold devastations” for the 
vast majority of the European powers.
179
 The war had also collapsed the balance-of-power 
order that had stemmed out from the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, which was believed to have 
stabilized European relations until 1914. Therefore, the British and French Governments at 
the end of WWI were especially keen to establish new institutions that would reconsolidate 
regional order and guarantee their country’s security.180 The British King George V’s 
message to the League of Nations Union in 13 October 1919 best illustrated the ambition; 
 
We fought to gain a lasting peace, and it is our supreme duty to take every measure to secure it. 
For that nothing is more essential than a strong and enduring League of Nations.
181 
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The American delegate had a similar determination. Their chief objective was to establish a 
world order that would ensure America’s peacefulness, neutrality and isolation.182 Under the 
policy of the Monroe Doctrine, US Government wanted to stay out of any foreign disputes.
183
 
The Americans thus perceived their entry into WWI as an ‘enforced participation’ against 
their will and the root of all evil was the European instability.
184
  
 
On the contrary, the Japanese Government perceived the Conference not in terms of 
peacemaking but as an opportunity to consolidate its great power status.
185
 Peacemaking was 
not the Japanese delegate’s main interest because WWI was not a hazardous experience for 
them.
186
 The Japanese state did not undergo any severe naval or land battles. Their 
involvement was limited to small military combats in China and the Pacific islands against 
the German powers.
187
 Yet, with the fact that Japan played roles in WWI and thus contributed 
to the Allied victory in 1919, the Japanese expected PPC to become a historical milestone in 
which Japan would be recognized as a “Great Power” with honour and dignity. They thus 
thought the West would revise their Social Darwinist stereotype on Japan.  
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Lastly, the geopolitics of empire was another issue at Paris. For the Japanese, one of the main 
interests was the China question. The colonial conquest of Chinese territories had long been 
one of Japan’s imperial interests.188 The Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (in office 1898-
1900), for instance, had addressed that “[t]he vastness of Manchuria and Eastern Siberia lured 
the island empire in search of raw materials and a safety valve for its growing population.”189 
In this context, the Japanese delegate showed the greatest interest in the discussions on the 
post-war settlement of German territories in China, especially the Shangdong Peninsula, 
which had critical geopolitical importance on the Japanese foreign agenda.
190
 By contrast, the 
Big Four’s regional agenda largely focused on Europe. The reconstruction of Central Europe 
and regulation of German reparation dominated their discussions.
191
 The objective of the 
British and French delegates was, for instance, to prevent Germany from becoming a menace 
again.
192
 They barely discussed post-war settlement of Asia with much attention, which made 
the Japanese delegate to re-recognize the West’s slight on non-Western regions and peoples.  
 
The Japanese delegate, however, did not spill out their frustration at Paris. When the debate 
on the European question was to the fore, the Japanese delegate rather went silent.
193
 A 
British newspaper on 28 January 1919 reported that Makino and his men were reading the 
documents quietly and were barely listening to the Euro-American debate.
194
 The Western 
leaders found the Japanese delegate’s attitude extremely impolite. French and British 
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newspapers in January 1919 criticized the Japanese delegates as “self-centred” people and 
used ironic expressions such as “silent partner” to express Japan’s uncooperative attitude.195  
 
There were two reasons why the Japanese delegates acted so passively. First, they wanted to 
avoid making ‘unnecessary’ antagonism with any Great Powers at the conference.196 Their 
interests at the meeting were straightforward: Chinese territory and racial equality.
197
 As their 
objectives were accomplished earlier in the Conference, the delegate saw no critical point in 
taking the risk to demand more from the West, which could give rise to extra ‘unnecessary’ 
issues. Second, the Japanese Government had told the diplomats not to rebel against the 
Western representatives at the Conference. The leaders back in Tokyo had insecurities 
regarding the Japanese diplomats’ lack of experience in multilateral diplomacy.198 Japan prior 
to 1919 indeed had experiences of diplomatic negotiations, but most of them were bilateral 
cases such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 
1907 were the only multilateral conventions they had ever attended. 
 
For these reasons, PPC and Japan’s membership in the League did not gain much support 
from the Japanese general public and amongst the traditionalist and Pan-Asianist members in 
the Government.
199
 The military officials of the Kwantung Army were the leading protesting 
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faction. They were frustrated by the Government leaders for not taking enough actions to 
emphasize Japan’s national interests.200 The sceptical view of the West was common amongst 
the general public as well. According to the historian Funao Akiko, hardly any newspapers in 
the early 1920s published articles that praised the government’s decision to join the 
League.
201
  
  
The ruling authorities of the Japanese Government in 1919 were mostly the successors of 
pro-Western Meiji leaders and hence the advocates of Fukuzawa’s Datsu-A Nyu-O rhetoric. 
They saw optimistically that the racial question would slowly fade if Japan, as the 
representative of Asia, made significant contributions to the League restlessly. The Foreign 
Minister Uchida Kousai gave a speech to the National Diet on 22 January 1920:  
… [the League Covenant] is the Great Charter of the New World … The [Japanese] 
Government has always wished to live in peace and to promote the further practice of 
international cooperation … We believe that our international reputation will be greatly 
enhanced [with the establishment of the League of Nations and Japan as a permanent member] 
and the diplomatic relations with the Great Powers would become even more important and 
strong. It will also grant us the chances to participate in the operations of world peacemaking 
… and I believe this is our Empire’s obligation.202 
The Government sent some of the most talented men, again, such as Makino, Nitobe Inazo 
and Ishii Kikujiro to serve the League system.
203
 This time the officials were not just sent as 
the representative of the Japanese Government. Few of them were dispatched to serve the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
declined Japan’s racial equality proposal. For the Japanese, the PPC was a total failure: it lost its tie with Britain 
and became an isolated power in the Far East again. 
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League agencies as ‘international officials’ like Nitobe and Yoshizawa Kenkichi. This change 
in the form of interaction indicated that the Japanese Government was no longer satisfied 
with the fact that Japan participating in international frameworks. It demanded the country to 
actually be part of them too.
204
 The Japanese Government also made monetary contributions. 
The financial share of the 1928 budget, for example, allocated Japan about US$291,000, 
which was indeed “as large as that of Italy and next only to that of Great Britain, France and 
Germany.” 205 This was despite Japan’s inferior capability in industry and economy compared 
to the European Powers.  
 
These efforts reflected the Japanese Government’s commitment not to repeat the bitter 
experience at The Hague Conferences and PPC.
206
 While the result of the Paris Peace 
Conference was not a very welcoming outcome, the governmental consensus was yet to stay 
in the Geneva order and strive to develop a great power status.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
204
 Japan had already attended a number of international conferences – such as The Hague Conferences and the 
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Nitobe Inazo: Between the East and the West 
 
 
 
Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933) was one of the Japanese figures who aimed to grant Japan a just 
place in the international community in the 1920s.
207
 For many, he is well-known for being 
an internationalist and the world’s first non-Western official to become the Under-Secretary 
General of the League of Nations in 1920.
208
 He is also famous as a patriot for writing the 
book Bushido: The Soul of Japan published in 1900. Nitobe was also a Social Darwinist.
209
 
He believed that Japan was in the “forefront of the Civilization in the East” and justified the 
Japanese expansionist and colonial policies in Taiwan and Korea.
210
 He was therefore often 
reviewed as an ‘international nationalist’ who represented both particularistic and universal 
ideas.
211
  
 
When the Tokugawa Government was toppled in the mid-1850s, Nitobe was five years 
old.
212
 The Meiji reformation, which forced Japanese people to mingle with the international 
community, alerted the peoples that “no longer could individuals limit their allegiance to their 
local areas.”213 They had to then “think of themselves as Japanese as opposed to the peoples 
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of many countries who began to appear among them.”214 Because Nitobe grew up in this 
environment, he was exposed to pro-Western and modernist thoughts from this youth. Under 
the Meiji Government’s educational curriculum, Nitobe studied Western understanding of 
nationhood and modernization with society’s expectation to become a government official 
who would lead Japan in the future.
215
  
 
His experience studying abroad in his twenties cultivated his further sense of internationalism. 
He lived in America and Germany in the 1880s and studied politics, diplomacy and 
philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Bonn.
216
 As a student in the 
so-called “New-Manifest-Destiny” America, Nitobe was strongly exposed to the creeds of 
“enlightenment,” “frontier and expansion” and “civilization.”217 He was also in the same 
politics classes with Woodrow Wilson – who later became the President of the United States 
in 1913 and establisher of the League of Nations in 1919.
218
 Historians commonly point out 
that this contact inspired Nitobe to develop the idea of so-called “Wilsonian Liberalism” that 
enabled him to become the Under-Secretary General of the League in 1920.
219
  
 
The experience living overseas also granted Nitobe the opportunity to realize how Japan and 
Japanese people were seen in Western communities. The reality was disappointing: Nitobe 
saw that only a few Americans could tell where Japan was on the world map, and most of 
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them identified “Asians” as one national entity.220 The words ‘Japanese’ and ‘Chinese,’ for 
example, were used in the same context.
221
 Nitobe perceived that this reality was problematic. 
Not only because Japan and China in the late nineteenth century had totally different national 
interests and international status, had they also had different cultural, social and religious 
values as well. Nitobe was certain that this improper worldview would not lead the 
international community to properly understand his home country’s nationhood. 
Subsequently, during his years in America, Nitobe perceived the need for correcting the 
West’s perception of the East. 
 
He saw that Western intellectuals had not developed enough understanding on the Japanese 
state as well. During his stay at Germany in 1887, Nitobe majored in agricultural political-
economy under the supervision of the Belgian professor Émile Louis Victor de Laveleye.
222
 
The following was one of the famous conversations Leveleye and Nitobe had about religious 
education in Japan: 
“Do you mean to say,” asked the venerable professor, “that you have no religious instruction in 
your schools?” On my reply in the negative he suddenly halted in astonishment, and in a voice 
which I shall not easily forget, he repeated “No religion! How do you impart moral 
education?”223  
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Since then, the idea of ‘interstate understanding’ began to develop as the key to world peace 
in Nitobe’s perception of international cooperation. Without knowing each other correctly 
and thoroughly, Nitobe believed that there could be no way countries and peoples of different 
cultural background develop trustful and long-lasting partnership.
224
 The culture shocks he 
underwent in America and Germany solidified his determination to realize his lifetime goal 
of becoming the “bridge across the Pacific Ocean” that would let “the ideas of the West and 
those of the East travel back and forth unimpeded.”225   
 
The attempt is best noticeable in his book Bushido: The Soul of Japan, published in English 
in 1900.
 226
 Nitobe perceived that the Bushido teachings were the symbol and the “national 
timbre” of “Japanese-ness” that defined the way Japanese people and state behaved and 
thought.
227
 Through introducing the “timbre,” Nitobe wanted the readers of the West to 
develop a certain degree of understanding of the Japanese state. In describing Japanese 
society and history, he often compared and contrasted them with well-known figures and 
historical incidents of the Western world.
 228
  For example, he analogized the history of 
Japanese feudalism with the one of Britain.
229
 Nitobe believed such a comparative technique 
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would provide the readers notions on the similarities and differences the state of Japan had 
with their countries of familiarity – and imagine what kind of a country ‘Japan’ was.  
 
The book introduced the seven important principles of the Bushido teachings.
230
 Nitobe 
highlighted “honour” as the most important doctrine in the traditional Japanese thinking.231 
The obtainment of a respected reputation (or perhaps a respected ‘recognition’) was regarded 
as the most praised status in Japanese societies; and the loss of honour was the most shameful 
status one could ever undergo. The ideology of ‘honour’ was therefore one of the earliest to 
be cherished in juvenile education.
232
 In the pursuit of honour, according to Nitobe, the 
Bushido wisdom induced Japanese people to be stoic, magnanimous, patient and forgiving.
233
 
Anger and aggression were not the subjects for honour. Making a sincere effort with hard 
work to succeed was what Japanese society perceived as ‘respectful.’   
 
These beliefs of Bushido were considerably different from Christian teachings, which was the 
“timbre” of Western societies. Nitobe thus knew that the Japanese entry into the international 
community would face many challenges.
234
 His task at Geneva was thus to support the 
Japanese delegate to find the nation’s just place in the world without getting them into 
diplomatic antagonism with the Western powers. In this regard, he perceived that the “bond” 
that had finally started to develop between the East and the West were not to be wasted.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the professional class of warriors naturally came into prominence. There were known as samurai, meaning, 
literally, like the old English cniht, guards or attendants …” 
230
 The seven creed are: Justice, Courage, Benevolence, Politeness, Truthfulness, Honor and Loyalty. 
231
 Nitobe, Bushido: Soul of Japan: 65-66. 
232
 Ibid.  
233
 Ibid., 65-72.  
234
 Hanai, Kokusai Jin Nitobe Inazo: Bushido to Kirisuto Kyo [The Internationalist Nitobe Inazo: Bushido and 
Christianity] 36-37. Nitobe himself was a Quaker. He was baptized at Sapporo, Japan, in 1878. Nitobe then was 
a student at the Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo Nou Gakkou), which was well-known for its highly 
Westernized environment and educational curriculum.  
Page 62 of 125 
 
Japan, the League, and Nitobe’s Career, 1920-1926 
 
 
 
Nitobe was a unique figure amongst the Japanese officials at Geneva. Primarily, he was not 
formerly a diplomat or a politician like other Japanese officials such as Yoshizawa Kenkichi 
and Ishii Kikujiro were.
235
 Nitobe was a professor of agriculture and agronomy and an author 
of Japanese culture.
236
 Furthermore, the appointment of Nitobe as the Under-Secretary 
General of the League Secretariat made his legal status not a member of the Japanese 
delegate. His noblesse oblige at Geneva was therefore not to defend Japan’s national interests 
in the League framework. Nitobe’s mission was to practice, realize and spread the League 
Covenant’s ideal. He had to urge the national representatives to regard “international interests” 
as essential to their “national interests,” as the Preamble of the Covenant stated.237 For these 
reasons, Nitobe never sat in the Assembly or the Council meetings as a delegate or cast a vote 
as a government representative during his career as an Under-Secretary General.
238
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Most importantly, the League was not “a Super-state.”239 The organization had no authority 
to dictate its member states and their international relations. The League was merely a 
framework of international cooperation that required spontaneous collaboration amongst the 
member states in order to work effectively and efficiently as a peacemaking organization.
240
 
Nitobe’s job was thus to urge the member states to develop this sense of internationality so 
that the League would fulfil its duty.  
 
Nitobe was an advocate of cultural internationalism in the making of world peace. This kind 
of internationalism maintains that “internationalism may best be fostered through cross-
national cultural communication, understanding, and cooperation.”241 For cultural 
internationalist like Nitobe, the outbreak of WWI exposed the limited validity of the 
“Westphalian” system in peace-building.242 The Westphalian order that upheld international 
law, military settlements and diplomatic negotiations as three pillars of peacemaking could 
not prevent the hostility from occurring in 1914.
243
 Nitobe thus saw that the international 
community was caught in a vicious circle. Wars and peace conferences had been taking place 
one after another throughout the history of mankind, and he saw this tragic spiral must be 
concluded. The concept of ‘peacemaking’ the Japanese man perceived while he was in office 
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at Geneva was the elimination of the mind of aggression itself from the international 
community. To accomplish this objective, Nitobe saw the crucial necessity to cultivate the 
consensus of cross-national understanding on the international basis. Nations of the world, he 
believed, must firstly apprehend each other’s interests, history and culture. They could then 
understand each other’s national interests and develop the sense of mutual appreciation.  
 
Nitobe hence played a role in the establishment of the International Committee on Intellectual 
Cooperation (ICIC) in 1922.
244
 Under the slogan “the world of knowledge knows no national 
frontiers,” the organization proposed to practice the philosophy of cultural internationalism 
through acting as a channel for intellectual interchange.
245
 ICIC launched a number of 
programs that promoted education of intercultural understanding worldwide. It provided 
students, teachers, and other non-governmental people in the field of education the 
opportunity to have international experiences so to teach and spread the principle of cultural 
internationalism to the next generations.
246
  
 
Upon the foundation of ICIC, Nitobe played a direct hand on the publication of booklets on 
intellectual life in various countries. One of his brochure published in 1925was titled “The 
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Use and Study of Foreign Languages in Japan: A Study in Cultural Internationalism.”247 
Nitobe began with introducing how the internationalization of Japanese education was carried 
out between 1853 and 1925.
248
 In the closing paragraphs of the brochure, he then went to 
discuss his ideas on cultural internationalism. Nitobe’s opinion was that the ideas of cultural 
internationalism would enable “one to see things from the world point of view.”249 The study 
of the foreign cultures, approaches and thoughts, Nitobe believed, would let people “objectify 
and project themselves among the nations of the world and see clearly where they stand.”250        
Additionally, he regarded that the principles of cultural internationalism was especially 
needed in the Japanese nation given the fact that its people had been isolated from foreign 
influences for over 260 years.
251
 The realization of this international climate of intercultural 
understanding was, Nitobe stated, the League’s ultimate objective which he often called as 
the “Geneva spirit.” 252  
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Nitobe’s philosophy of cultural internationalism gained wide support at Geneva. ICIC’s 
prominent members in the early years included internationally prominent scholars such as 
Albert Einstein, Henri Bergson and Marie Curie.
253
 Bergson, who later became the 
Committee’s first chairman, was one of the most passionate members. In one of his speeches 
at Geneva, he maintained that ICIC’s mission was to become the League’s “soul.”254 Bergson 
saw that the Committee should urge diplomats and politicians to acknowledge “the deeper 
spirit of the League” that the Organization was not established only for political, economic 
and military purposes. The Geneva spirit was also to respect cultural, social, and intellectual 
unity amongst peoples and nations across the globe for the making of perpetual peace.
255
  
 
Nitobe and his colleagues wanted ICIC to become truly international.
256
 By the word 
‘international’ Nitobe meant ‘non-Eurocentric.’ He did not wish to see the Committee 
becoming another League Assembly where the Great Powers of Europe, particularly Britain, 
France and Italy, were to exercise authoritative power and the voices of Asians and Africans 
were to be largely disregarded. ICIC hence ratified the membership of intellectuals regardless 
of their racial, religious, cultural and political beliefs.
257
 For example, the Committee 
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welcomed the participation of scholars from non-League nations, such as Japan after 1933, 
America since 1920 and colonized states including India.
258
  
 
The ICIC members were also conscious of the distance between “intellectual elites and the 
masses” which they regarded as a “veritable danger” in pursuing world peace.259 Bergson told 
his colleagues in September 1922 that the ICIC (and the League as well) should not become a 
“supra-national intelligence” body.260 He believed the Committee must open its doors to the 
general public and never be “divorced from the masses of the world.”261 In order to avoid 
another WWI from breaking out, he believed that the principle of cultural internationalism 
must be cultivated not only in the minds of intellectuals and government officials but also in 
the minds of the mass too.
262
 Most of the Committee’s intellectual projects therefore involved 
peoples from civil sectors such as students and teachers.
263
  
 
ICIC’s attempt to spread of the principles of cultural internationalism was not a 
straightforward path, however. The historian F.P. Walters’s expression that although ICIC 
“rendered many useful services to intellectual workers … it failed completely to bring them 
into a common front against the dangers of national hatreds and national ambition” best 
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describes the situation.
264
 There was a critical gap between the principles of internationalism 
the Committee and the diplomatic leaders of the Great Powers wanted to pursue.   
 
The discord was evident as early as in 1919.
265
 Amongst the participating states of PPC, the 
Belgian delegate showed the most passionate attitude in promoting intellectual 
collaboration.
266
 One of the Belgian agents was Henri-Marie La Fontaine.
267
 The Belgian 
intellectual gave a speech at Paris and requested the leaders of the Great Powers to consider 
adding intellectual collaboration as one of the post-WWI settlement agendas.
268
 La Fontaine, 
like other cultural internationalists, perceived the outbreak of WWI as an example of the fatal 
limitation of the “Westphalian” order in regulating Europe’s stability.  
 
However, as discussed earlier, the Big Four hardly showed interests in working on the 
proposal. Their primary focus was economic regulations, military expansion and diplomatic 
reputation. As a matter of fact, the League Covenant adopted no Acts either on intellectual 
collaboration or cultural exchange.
269
 Furthermore, ICIC’s legal status in the League 
framework was either a “League agency” or a “specialized organization” that was given 
certain privileges similar to the International Labour Organization as well. The Committee’s 
status was merely a ‘consultant body.’270 This reality represented the reality in which the 
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League Assembly and Council had barely paid their attention on the concept of cultural 
internationalism.  
 
This disharmony resulted in the ICIC members to face difficulties in popularizing the idea of 
cultural internationalism, especially in Europe. This was because the International Union of 
Academies (UAI), founded by La Fontaine and his colleagues in 1907, had already been 
practicing the role as an interstate organization responsible of managing intellectual 
collaboration amongst European institutions.
271
 UAI often refused to collaborate with the 
League owing to La Fontaine’s unpleasant experience in Paris.272 This situation made 
Nitobe’s ideal difficult to sweep across European member states.  
 
Another obstacle was Sir James Eric Drummond’s indifference to the idea of intellectual 
collaboration.
273
 The Secretary General spent most of his time working on hard-politics 
problems such as the German admission in 1926 and the series of wars mostly in the Balkan 
Peninsula.
274
 In this context, League-UAI relations saw no critical improvements in the 1920s. 
For instance, UAI’s Belgian official Paul M. G. Otlet (1868-1944) wrote a letter to the 
League Secretariat in 1920 and requested the Organization to found a university specialized 
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in peacemaking studies.
275
 Drummond was yet unwilling to spend his time on the soft-politics 
topic. He just handed the letter over to Nitobe the Under-Secretary General.
276
 Because the 
Japanese intellectual was an advocate of cultural internationalism, he praised Otlet’s request 
as great contribution to the realization of world peace.
277
 Drummond, nonetheless, vetoed the 
proposal and refused to fund the UAI, ICIC and the Secretariat for this plan.
278
 This case 
worsened the inter-organizational relationship furthermore.  
 
The ICIC failed to neither resolve the Japanese Government’s situations nor satisfy its 
demands. For the Japanese, the 1920s was an era of confusion, adaptation and struggle. 
Primarily, the League, most importantly, was the first “international framework of nations” 
that Japan was involved in. The Japanese delegate and the Government in the early 1920s 
needed time to adapt to and understand the League politics.
279
 The Japanese confusion is best 
illustrated in the book written by the Swiss-American official of the League Permanent 
Mandates Commission William E. Rappard published in 1925; 
The reticence of the Japanese which is certainly their chief characteristic abroad, is open to very 
different interpretations. Some see in it the evidence of extreme profundity and possible evil-
mindedness … I am stuck with the extreme difficulty which all Japanese experience in learning 
and in speaking any of our Western languages. This circumstance, as well as their moral isolation 
as representatives in the West of the sole power of the East, gives them a feeling of unfamiliarity 
and insecurity which, with their innate state of dignity, they conceal behind the screen of 
reticence.
280
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Moreover, the Great Kanto Earthquake struck the Tokyo region on 1 September 1923.
281
 The 
disaster marked the end to Japan’s rapid industrialization, forcing the Japanese Government 
to focus on domestic reconstruction. The 1920s also saw the rise of anti-Japanese movements 
in China and Korea, such as the Chinese Civil War and the May Fourth Movement, had 
begun to threaten Japan’s national interests in the Asian mainland.282 Additionally, the Great 
Depression and the Showa Financial Crisis severely hit Japanese economy in the late 
1920s.
283
 The economic crises left the Japanese society in complete disorder. Unemployment 
rate skyrocketed and food shortage resulted in death from starvation amongst the people.
284
 
These difficulties made the Japanese Government focus predominantly on solving the 
domestic problems instead of thinking high of the League’s international agenda. In other 
words, Japan in this era needed an immediate measure that would quickly rescue the nation 
from turmoil. The Committee’s long-range, future-investing plan was, in practice, not in 
precise need.  
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The Bridge Collapses: Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-45  
 
 
 
For these reasons, the international community began to lose the sense of unity and 
cooperation by the late 1920s.
285
 Especially owing to the Street Wall Crush of 1929, the 
countries such as America, Britain and Japan began to build and live within their own “block 
of global order.” Their primary concern was the reconstruction of domestic economy, as seen 
in the cases such as US President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal program and Japanese 
Minister of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo’s Reflation policy.286  
 
The difficult situation in the 1930s urged the rise of ultranationalist and militarist politicians 
to power in the Japanese Diet. This was because they proposed invasion of Manchuria as a 
breakthrough to rescue the Japanese mass in chaos. The Northern Chinese territory was well-
known for the richness in natural resources and for its fertile lands.
287
 It was obvious that the 
acquisition of Manchuria would get Japanese society out from the disorder.
288
 The general 
public hence supported the ultranationalists and militarists to obtain power.
289
 In this context, 
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the Cabinet in the years between 1931 and 1945 was largely dominated by the hawkish, right-
wing officials and military generals, such as Saito Makoto, Konoe Fumimaro and Tojo 
Hideki.
290
 
 
September 1931 was a turning point in the history of the League, of Japan and of the 
world.
291
 The Japanese Kwantung Army, which was one of the most active protestors of the 
Government’s pro-West policies, invaded Manchuria against the League Covenant’s 
principle of peaceful coexistence.
292
 China appealed to the League for redress.
293
 The League 
of Nations then imposed the Lytton Report in December 1931 and urged the Japanese to 
leave Manchuria immediately. The Japanese nonetheless ignored the warning and established 
a puppet government in February 1932.
294
 The Japanese leaders then justified the invasion as 
a “civilizing mission” and “defence of national interests” that the Western empires were 
practicing in other Asian and African territories as well.
295
 The Euro-American leaders 
regarded the Japanese aggression as a “blatant piece of expansionism” and called for an 
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Assembly at Geneva in order to discuss the case.
296
 At the League Assembly on 27 March 
1933, the Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yousuke condemned the Lytton Report and announced 
Japan’s withdrew from the League of Nations:297  
Unhappily, there exists between Our Empire and the League of Nations a wide divergence of view 
in this regard and it has devolved upon Us to cause Our Government to take, upon mature 
deliberation, the necessary steps for the withdrawal of Our Empire from the League.
298
 
The Japanese withdrawal marked the total discord between Japan’s and the West-League’s 
principle of internationalism. It meant the Japanese Government, then run by the 
ultranationalists and militarists, would not respect the principles of the League Covenant 
anymore.  
 
The vast majority of the Japanese mass had advocated Matsuoka’s decision.299 Most 
newspaper companies praised the Foreign Minister’s determination as an “appropriate and 
logical decision” that “proudly” defended Japan’s national interests in Asia.300 The papers 
commonly went to criticize the Western powers for not showing enough consideration and 
respect to the disastrous situation Japan was in.
301
 The Tokyo Asahi newspaper on 3 October 
1933 stated, for instance, that the Lytton Report one-sidedly criticized the Japanese forces 
and did not provide any in-depth research of the incident itself.
302
 Similarly, on 25 November 
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1933, the Yomiuri newspaper argued that the Manchurian Incident was purely an “Asian 
crisis” and was not the Western-dominated League of Nations’ business.303  
 
With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, WWII in Asia broke out. 
The leaders of Japan redefined Japanese internationalism as a militarist, ultranationalist and 
Pan-Asian rhetoric, as best illustrated with Tojo’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
speech in 1943.
304
 They justified Japanese aggression as “liberation of Asia from Western 
empires” and “the solidification of Japan’s international status as Asia’s leader.”305  
 
However, not every Japanese authority was an advocate of the Pacific War. There were 
politicians and intellectuals who tried to contain the rising popularity of militarism and ease 
the growing Japanese-American tension.
306
 For example, the Japanese literary scholar 
Anesaki Masaharu joined the ICIC in 1933 and stayed in Geneva until 1939.
307
 He believed 
the greatest cause of the diplomatic antagonism was the lack of understanding amongst the 
Great Powers. He published journal articles on the Japanese issue so that Euro-American 
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authorities would understand the situation his country was in.
308
 In the political sphere, the 
Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (in office 1931-32) and the diplomat Yoshida Shigeru were 
the leading figures.
309
 They both saw the rise of militarism and anti-Westernism amongst the 
mass as not a very welcoming situation. However, Japan under the militarist rule was not a 
place for freedom of speech. Consequently, the former was assassinated in May 1932 and the 
latter was imprisoned for being a hikokumin.
310
 
 
The defeat of Japan in August 1945 did not only mean its military downfall as a Great 
Power.
311
 The historian Patrick Finney’s observation of Japanese diplomacy in this era that 
“the neglect of profound forces, ideological drives, and domestic political and economic 
structures” had “conducted at points to a narrative that emphasized contingency, blunders and 
misjudgements, and lost opportunities” best describes the dynamics.312 That is, Japanese 
internationalism in this period was so mono-cultural and uni-polarized that the foreign policy 
lacked flexibility. Until 1931, Japan had focused on building its international bond only with 
the West. Japan had heavily relied on the Western countries for its economic, political and 
military supplies.
313
 The Meiji leaders totally disregarded Asia as an ‘uncivilized’ region. In 
this regard, once Japan’s relation with the West deteriorated in the late 1920s, the Japanese 
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empire found itself isolated in the international community with no reliable supply of 
resources to sustain the country’s strength. The only choice they had was to invade 
Manchuria and secure the ‘lifeline’ itself, which consequently led Japan to face the 
devastating defeat in August 1945. Thus, history had shown that Japanese policymakers must 
not uni-polarize the foreign policy. The lesson was that they must practice multilateral 
diplomacy so that they would not face a situation in which they find themselves completely 
isolated all of the sudden.  
 
Historians often portray the years between 1931 and 1945 as a period of radical transition in 
the Japanese history.
314
 They often point out the dramatic turn the Japanese diplomacy had 
taken in September 1931 as the evidence, which implied that the pro-Western policies were 
replaced with the ultranationalist and Pan-Asian rhetoric on Japan’s foreign agenda. When 
viewed in a longue duree, however, ones could question this historical interpretation. In other 
words, it is possible to argue that the Pacific War was not a ‘radical’ incident that restructured 
Japanese diplomacy with totally new principles, but was rather part of the Japanese pursuit of 
honour, which had been the national consensus since 1853. It is indeed true that Japan’s 
diplomatic policies had dramatically changed over this period. However, the ultimate purpose 
of the Pacific War was the same as the one of the pro-Western figures: the search for honour 
that would grant Japan a respected title in the international community. The only differences 
were the approach taken and how the leaders in power regarded the definition of a “Great 
Power.” On one hand, the pro-Western figures between 1919 and 1931 selected diplomatic 
negotiations and cultural interchanges as their approach. They saw a “Great Power” referred 
to a state that possessed strong military power, respected Western nationhood, and 
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contributed to the development of the international community. On the other hand, the 
ultranationalist leaders regarded a “Great Power” as a country that respected its own national 
values and practice armed aggression to expel the ‘barbarians’ from its regional community. 
While the diplomatic policies and approaches changed over this period, we could affirm that 
ideologically the ultimate objective of the Japanese state remained constant.  
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Chapter 4: The Role of the United Nations in the Making of the “New” 
Japanese Internationalism, 1945-2006 
 
 
 
 “Diplomatic failure should be welcome, if by it you learn wisdom for future action.” 315  
– Nitobe Inazo 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Japan in the immediate post-war era was identified by the world and by its own community 
as one of the defeated powers in WWII who had to compensate for the war crimes. At the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the wartime leaders of the Japanese empire 
were purged and the Japanese archipelago was decided to be occupied by General Douglas 
MacArthur’s US forces. Japan in September 1945 lost its sovereignty and honour as one of 
the Great Powers in the international community.  
 
The consensus amongst the Japanese leaders in the post-1945 era was therefore to revive the 
country’s international status as an independent, honourable state. The effort in the early 
years of the period is best noticeable from the role of the politician Yoshida Shigeru (Prime 
Minister, 1946-47 and 1948-54 / Foreign Minister, 1945-47 and 1948-52). The so-called 
Yoshida Doctrine outlined his ideas on how Japan’s great power status could be revived. The 
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traumatizing experience of WWII, best illustrated with the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
cultivated a consensus amongst the Japanese people that the nation’s “catch-up with the West” 
campaign in the post-war world must, most importantly, reject Japan to play any military 
role.
316
 The national consensus was hence not to repeat the tragedy again.
317
  Yoshida thus 
employed the principles of pacifism and multiculturalism in his doctrine in urging Japan’s re-
rise to a Great Power once again.
318
   
 
The UN occupied a prominent place in Japan’s post-war foreign policy. In addition to the 
Yoshida Doctrine’s pro-UN principle, the Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (in office 1957-60) 
proclaimed the so-called ‘UN-centrism’ policy upon Japan’s successful admission in 
December 1956.
319
 He maintained that the Japanese Government would place its primary 
emphasis on the cultivation of a trustful, long-lasting relation with the UN.
320
 The history 
between 1945 and 2006 indeed shows that Japanese leaders of this period had commonly 
seen the Organization as the symbol of the international community in which Japan had to 
return to. This was despite the fact that the initial membership of the UN was largely 
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consisted of Japan’s wartime enemies such as America, Britain and Soviet Russia.321 
Moreover, Japan did not even take part in the process of UN creation.
322
 In addition to how 
Japanese internationalism developed in this era, I also examine what factors urged the 
Japanese authorities to see the organization of wartime enemies so important that Japan had 
to join.   
 
 
The Yoshida Doctrine and the United Nations 
 
 
 
Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967) was one of the leaders of the Japanese Government who 
strived to put Japan back in track.
323
 At the end of WWII, Japan lied in ruins. The capital of 
Tokyo was air raided and the port cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were atomic bombed. 
The economy had collapsed, the industrial basis was devastated, and the social order was 
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in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Post-War Japan  (Los Angeles: California University Press, 1997). 
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corrupted.
 324
 Most important, the nation had lost its great power status. Yoshida thus had two 
chief tasks as the Prime Minister of Japan: (1) the removal of the Japanese nation’s stigma as 
a defeated power; and (2) the revival of the honourable status.
325
  
 
Historians such as Michael J. Green say the Yoshida Doctrine had three objectives: close 
alliance with the US, minimal military rearmament, and a focus on economic recovery.
326
 But 
a different idea appealed when viewed from an internationalist approach. The history of 
Japanese internationalism outlines that the Yoshida Doctrine had two objectives. And they 
reflected the principles of what historians have often termed “political internationalism” and 
“economic internationalism.” The former refers to the idea that the application of an 
international organization would contribute to the pacification of interstate relations.
 327
 The 
historian Akira Iriye comments that the League of Nations was the best example of political 
internationalism in this sense.
328
 Economists of the nineteenth century such as Jean-Baptiste 
Say and Gustave de Molinari were the fathers of economic internationalism.
329
 They 
maintained that the world could be connected by economic welfare and commercial 
interdependence.
330
 This school of thought stated that because economic development was 
the universal demands of every nation, the consensus of financial wealth could unite 
countries of different civilizational background and consequently pacify their interstate 
                                                          
324
 Finney, Remebering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective 
Memory: 264-65. According to Finney, “With three million war dead, nine million homeless and one third of its 
national wealth destroyed, Japan was certainly in a parlous state at the close of hostilities. Moreover, hardships 
such as food shortages, mass unemployment, black marketeering, and rampant inflation persisted through much 
of the occupation.” (sic) 
325
 Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization  
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 30.  
326
 See: Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism  (New York: Palgrave, 2003).  
327
 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation 5-12. 
328
 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order 57. 
329
 Goldmann, The Logic of Internationalism: Coercion and Accommodation 5-12. 
330
 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order 59-60. 
Page 83 of 125 
 
relations.
331
 Yoshida found these two principles useful in leading the Japanese nation to 
emerge as a Great Power once again.  
 
The doctrine’s first objective was about securing Japan’s national safety.332 Yoshida believed 
that the Japanese state must put itself in a politically and militarily protected situation before 
moving on to the reconstruction campaign.
333
 In addition to the rise of Red China in October 
1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the fact that Japan had no armed 
force of its own urged Yoshida to emphasize such need.
334
 Evidently, an invasion on a 
militarily weakened Japan would destroy the country as well as the reconstruction. Thus, 
Yoshida wanted to solidify Japanese defence first to prevent that situation from taking place. 
In addition to a close alliance with America, the Prime Minister employed the idea of 
political internationalism and saw the UN with exceptional importance. The UN Charter 
stated that every member state’s national security would be guaranteed with the principle of 
collective security.
335
 A membership in the organization meant world powers such as 
America and Britain would come to safeguard Japan’s security in case of dispute.336 It also 
meant the UN would contain the potential enemies of Russia and China from invading the 
Japanese archipelago as well.  
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The Japanese Government also regarded the UN as the symbol of the international 
community in which Japan must return to.
337
 The Japanese leaders in the post-war years, 
including Yoshida, perceived that the UN membership would enable Japan state to revive its 
honour in three ways.
 338
 Firstly, Japan wanted its status as a member of the world community 
back. Through joining the UN, the Japanese leaders aimed to convey that Japan was ready to 
respect the principles of the UN Charter, such as peaceful settlement, international justice, 
and collective security.
339
 Secondly, they wanted to emphasize the pacifist creeds of the new 
Japanese Constitution that clearly stated Japan’s rejection to play any military role.340 The 
Constitution clearly declared that Japan would not seek to practice any self-benefitting 
aggression.
341
 Thirdly, the Japanese Government was determined to become the “bridge 
between the Occident and the Orient” so to play a contribute role in the UN system.342 With 
its bilateral identity as a ‘Westernized Asian’ state, the Japanese officials saw Japan’s 
noblesse oblige in the Organization was to represent the voices of both Asian and Western 
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nations.
343
 Yoshida clarified these principles in the speech he gave at San Francisco on 7 
September 1951 after signing the peace treaty with the United States. 
… there has risen a new Japan. My people have been among those who suffered greatly from the 
destruction and devastation of the recent war. Purged by that suffering of all untoward ambition, of 
all desire for the path of military conquest, my people burn now with a passionate desire to live at 
peace with their neighbours in the Far East, and in the entire world, and to rebuild their society so 
that it will in ever greater fullness yield a better life for all. Japan has opened a new chapter in its 
history. We see in the future a new era among nations, an era of peace and harmony as described 
in the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations.
344
 
The national representatives of fifty-two countries attended the conference, and the vast 
majority of them were the members of the UN.
345
 Yoshida’s intention to use political 
internationalism to revive Japan’s international status was clearly noticeable.  
 
The second objective of the Doctrine was economic reconstruction.
346
 Yoshida applied the 
principle of economic internationalism, which was frequently called the “Economic Foreign 
Policy” amongst the Government officials at the time.347 Economic reconstruction was one of 
the most important issues in the immediate post-war era as mentioned before.
348
 In urging the 
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reconstruction campaign, the Prime Minister faced the problem that many of the Japanese 
leaders in the past had struggled to solve: the Japanese archipelago’s lack of raw materials 
and food. The amount was absolutely insufficient to sustain the population of roughly 90 
million people.
349
 In the past, the leaders tried to overcome this issue by obtaining overseas 
territories. Japan’s colonization of Taiwan in 1895 was indeed for this purpose.350 Yet, 
imperialism was obviously no longer a rational choice in the post-1945 world. Japan was 
under US occupation and, most importantly, it had rejected to play any military role in the 
first place.  
 
Yoshida thus developed an economic internationalist approach. He believed that Japan in the 
international climate of the post-war world must move on “from a position of total self-
reliance to one of heavy dependence on the world.”351 This meant that Japan should not 
uphold any autarchic ideas, but rather become a liberal nation that has international bonds 
with many countries. History had indeed shown that Japan in the interwar period had dug its 
own grave owing to the lack of this multilateral thought. The Yoshida Doctrine thus proposed 
the economic reconstruction and making of a worldwide network of active trading and 
commerce so that Japan could consolidate its status and influence as an “economic 
superpower.”352 Even though Japan had no military power, the Prime Minister was yet certain 
that economic wealth could substitute it in the world where the value of capital was 
dramatically increasing. Japan under Yoshida was thus determined not to not play military 
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roles but would practice economic campaigns that would create new businesses, fundi its 
strategic partners and help the development of underdeveloping countries. 
  
While Yoshida saw the UN and economic development as the two important themes in the 
post-war world, the UN agencies specializing in economic development were not emphasized 
as key actors in his paradigm. Organizations such as the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), the World Bank (WB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were not 
given especial attention. This nature reflected the Japanese Government’s consensus in the 
post-war era to keep Japan’s diplomatic profile as low as possible.353 As discussed before, 
Yoshida and his colleagues saw the UN’s significance only as the place for security and 
status-building and not necessarily for making Japan diplomatically popular. Most 
importantly, the Prime Minister wanted his country to stay on the sideline of the Cold War 
tension both economically and militarily, so that they could focus solely on the reconstruction 
effort. Yoshida thus rejected any Japanese involvement in diplomatic incidents unless they 
exposed exceptional threat to Japan’s national security.354    
 
Yoshida’s strong fixation with the national reconstruction campaign had its origin in his 
career as a diplomat who had witnessed Japan’s rise and fall as a Great Power between 1906 
and 1945. Yoshida entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1906.
355
 The period 
was when the Japanese empire was on its gradual rise to a Great Power in the aftermath of the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. It was thus when the Western powers had started to see 
Japan as a potential menace in the East, particularly over China, where the imperial interests 
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of many Great Powers had all concentrated on. In this historically significant era and place, 
Yoshida had served the Consulate-General in Hoten, Manchuria between the early 1920s and 
October 1925.
356
 He was then appointed the Administrative Vice-Minister of MOFA in the 
Pan-Asianist and nationalist Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi’s cabinet in 1928. Yoshida served 
as Tanaka’s advisor on the China question.357 This appointment granted Yoshida the chance 
to witness Realpolitik played between Japan and the Great Powers. 
 
The authorities of MOFA and the Government yet disappointed the young diplomat’s 
enterprise. In early 1900s, the Japanese Cabinet was largely dominated by the pro-West 
politicians such as Uchida Kousai and Shidehara Kijuro.
358
 The national policy was hence to 
cultivate a cooperative and friendly relation with the Western powers and to avoid developing 
any antagonistic associations with them. In this context, the Government ordered the 
diplomats in China to coordinate the policies that would not overlap with the national 
interests of the Great Powers.
359
 A typical case was the Triple Intervention in April 1895. 
Japan returned the territory it gained in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War upon the 
joint-interference of Russia, Germany and France. Yoshida disliked the pro-Western, 
compromising policy.
360
 Even though the Japanese empire was still militarily, politically and 
economically a weak power, he argued that the nation must practice a more aggressive 
strategy that would defend Japan’s national interests and honour. He saw the pro-Western 
diplomatic approach was making Japan seem spineless to the Western rivals and putting 
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Japan in further political backwardness.
361
 Yoshida in this context gradually developed the 
determination to make Japan a powerful nation. He did not want to see his home country in a 
humiliating position – just like how Fukuzawa was frustrated by the Tokugawa regime in the 
1850s. 
 
The 1930s was a decade of struggle for Yoshida again. He perceived the militarist 
government’s national policy lacked objective analysis on the international climate. As seen 
in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, withdrawal from the League in 1933 and alliance 
with Nazi Germany in 1940, the Japanese Government under the leadership of the 
ultranationalists were preparing for a war against Britain and America in the Pacific. Yoshida 
was against this decision. He did not see any benefit from waging a war against the two 
parties.
362
 Most importantly, the enormous gap in industrial capability between the two blocs 
clearly foreshadowed Japan’s defeat sooner or later. He also saw that the aggression would 
take the Japanese nation to a diplomatically position.
363
 Yoshida had served Japanese 
embassies as a diplomat in London and other Western cities.
364
 He knew that Britain and 
America were the ‘big two’ of world politics and that Japan was still a ‘rising power’ which 
had no capability to face them equally.  
 
For these reasons, the main principles of the Yoshida Doctrine adopted the pro-Western, 
pacifist, political internationalist and economic internationalist thoughts.
365
 From his 
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experience as a diplomat, he learnt that foreign policymaking must be based on a pragmatic 
analysis of the international climate. Yoshida also saw the necessity to think high of national 
honour to avoid the international community from developing a negative impression of 
Japan.
366
  In this regard, the Yoshida Doctrine outlined the method in which Japan could gain 
the maximum ‘profit’ with pragmatic objectives. While the UN was indeed an organization of 
wartime enemies, he saw the benefit in Japan joining the coalition was greater than the degree 
of shame and risk his home country would undergo if it remained isolated. The history of the 
1930s had proven that isolationism was an effective choice.  
 
 
Liberal and Pacifist Japan: Road to UN Admission, 1945 - 56 
 
 
 
Japan joined the list of applicants of UN membership in 1952, following the end of US 
occupation in 1951.
367
 However, the affiliation with the UN was not realized until December 
1956 because Cold War tension had paralysed the UN system’s capability to function 
properly.
368
 For example, the Soviet representatives boycotted the UNSC sessions upon the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.
369
 The Russian ambassador Yakob Malik used a 
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bundle of vetoes and oppressed suggestions from the American bloc for the next few years.
370
 
The rising tension between the Russian and American blocs over Europe and Asia turned the 
UN into a political arena especially with their development of nuclear weapons.
371
 The 
superpowers played power politics and justified their state objectives and interests using the 
principles of the UN Charter.
372
 The Organization’s core principle of democracy was thus 
completely crippled. For these reasons, the authorities of MOFA in 1954 was “deeply upset 
by this trend” and mourned that its membership would not be realized soon in the “UN 
crisis.”373 Some officials even began to question that whether the corrupted Organization was 
actually worth joining.
374
 
 
The new Japanese Constitution’s Article 9 was another issue. Drafted by the Japanese 
Government under Yoshida’s leadership and the American Occupational Forces, the clause 
embodied democratization and demilitarization as Japan’s national creeds and read as 
follows:
375
    
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
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international disputes … land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
376
 
In short, Article 9 banned the Japanese nation to take military activities of any kind.
377
 
Historians thus often illustrated it as the symbol of Japanese pacifism in the post-war era.
378
 
The pacifist clause, on one hand, gave the Japanese authorities a moral reason to stay away 
from the Cold War disputes. The “idealism embodied in Article 9” justified the Yoshida 
Doctrine’s principle of disregarding international climate and focusing on domestic 
agenda.
379
 The historian Donald C. Hellmann’s analysis that Article 9 was ‘idealism’ is 
cogent because the Japanese pacifism was not a practical ethos in the immediate post-war era. 
As a matter of fact, Article 9 soon aroused grave doubts regarding “Japan’s ability, as a 
totally disarmed nation, to maintain its own security” in both the domestic and international 
spheres.
380
 
 
The founders of the UN, on the other hand, had acknowledged the reality that war and 
peacemaking were inseparable factors in international relations.
381
 They developed this 
consensus from the League’s experience.  Despite the League’s attempts to settle down 
interstate disputes peacefully and cultivate international understanding, aggressions had yet 
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never ceased to exist.
382
 The UN founders hence had acknowledged the need for writing the 
Charter based on the premise that war was an inescapable factor in the post-WWII era as well. 
They thus saw the necessity to outline a clear-cut measure in how the UN would face and 
sanction an ongoing aggression in the Charter.
383
  
 
The founders also revised the League’s principle of collective security that was believed to 
create and maintain world peace.
384
 Article 11 of the League Covenant outlined the original 
principle; 
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, 
is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action 
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.
385
 
 
Historians often highlight that the Covenant’s failure to specify the member states’ obligation 
in the principle of collective security was one of the League framework’s flaws.386 While 
Article 11 stated the “League shall take any action” in case of disputes, the League yet did 
not possess any armed forces that could impose practical measures to deter aggression and/or 
punish the aggressor. On the contrary, military forces had remained solely under national 
control of the member states and were predominantly mobilized to suit their “own tastes and 
                                                          
382
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interests” in reality.387 This was one of the reasons why the League could not stop the 
escalation of the Japanese aggression in 1931.
388
 The drafters of the UN Charter hence 
ratified the use of military forces as part of the collective security approach.
389
 As seen in the 
UN involvement in the Korean War (1950-52) and the Suez Crisis (1956), armed intervention 
by the Organization was ‘approved’ by the international community. Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution, however, had banned any Japanese involvement in armed conflicts. This meant 
that Japan would not take part in UN collective security missions. In other words, this 
implied that Japan would not be able to fulfil the obligation the UN Charter had stated, which 
made Japanese admission come to a deadlock by the late 1940s.
390
 
 
Meanwhile, Japanese society sector was attempting to accelerate the course of post-war 
reconstruction privately by welcoming UN peacemaking agencies into the country. UNESCO 
was the leading institution in this movement. Its Constitution had stated in its preface that 
“since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace 
must be constructed.”391 The pacifist statement shared a great variety of commonalities with 
what the new Japanese Constitution and people had proposed to exercise and practice in the 
                                                          
387
 Ibid., 7. 
388
 Northedge, The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946 159. 
389
 Luard, A History of the United Nations - Volume 1: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955: 6. The 
‘teeth’ is traceable from Article 39 and Article 42 of the UN Charter :Article 39 states: “The Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” Article 42 states: Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, 
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United 
Nations. For more the primary sources, see: United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Chapter 7 – 
Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression ". 
390
 Japanese Association of International Law, Japan and the United Nations: Prepared for the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace: 18. 
391
 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, "UNESCO Constitution,"  
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
Page 95 of 125 
 
post-war period.
392
 From as early as in the late 1940s, NGOs anxious to actively participate in 
UNESCO’s peacemaking projects were established across the Japanese archipelago.393 In 
July 1947, only a year after the founding of UNESCO, voluntary associations were founded 
by independent, non-governmental groups with the aim of cooperating with the Organization 
in Sendai city in Northern Japan.
394
 This movement then spread across the Japanese 
archipelago, followed by one in the Kansai region and another in Kyushu.
395
 Consequently, in 
November 1947, Japan’s first National Conference for UNESCO was held in Tokyo, which 
was indeed four years before its official membership in the Organization in 1951.
396
  
 
Together with UNESCO, the Japanese private sector worked on numbers of social reforms. 
One of the greatest achievements was in the field of education.
397
 Prior to 1945, the kokutai 
(national policy) was to cultivate patriotic and Shinto understandings amongst the youth. 
Especially between the 1860s and 1945, the so-called ‘rich country, strong military’ 
campaign was the governmental order. It glorified Shintoism, nationalism and imperialism as 
                                                          
392
 Matsunori Hiratsuka, "Japan and UNESCO," International Review of Education 12, no. 3 (1966): 271. 
393
 Ibid., 271-72. 
394
 Ibid. UNESCO was established in November 1945 as the successor of ICIC. The foundation was discussed 
from October 1942 when the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education first met.  The French diplomat Henri 
Bonnet was one of the most passionate advocates. He perceived the root of all evil that led WWII to occur was 
“the background of cultural and intellectual destruction wrought by the Axis powers.”  The Frenchman also saw 
that ICIC’s inability to promote cultural internationalism had lied in its limited diversity of specialization.  In 
other words, ICIC’s failure proved that intellectual cooperation alone was insufficient to cultivate the mind of 
peace amongst peoples and nations. Therefore, upon the foundation of UNESCO, Bonnet and other official in 
the early years, such as Julian Huxley and Joseph Needham, agreed that the succeeding organization of ICIC 
must be “stronger and larger” than the predecessor.  In this context, they broadened UNESCO’s role as an 
organization for the global management of not only intellectuality but also other soft-power factors, such as 
science, education and culture as well. For more on the history of UNESCO, see the following scholarship: 
Pemberton, "The Changing Shape of Intellectual Cooperation: From the League of Nations to UNESCO."; J.P. 
Singh, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Changing Norms for a 
Complex World (New York: Routledge, 2011); S. Nihal Singh, The Rise and Fall of UNESCO  (Maryland: The 
Riverdale Company Publishers, 1988); Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley," 
Journal of World History 21, no. 3 (2010). 
395
 Hiratsuka, "Japan and UNESCO," 271-72. 
396
 Ibid. 
397
 Ibid., 273. 
Page 96 of 125 
 
the right understanding of nationhood and world.
398
 The total defeat in WWII then implied 
such a policy was a total mistake. The disaster revealed that the objective of the patriotic 
education was to justify the Government’s imperialist and militarist strategy and not 
necessarily to urge the nation’s pure development. Thus, the private sector and UNESCO 
worked cooperatively in educational reform. The Government then joined the progression in 
the 1950s as soon as they realized its official membership in July 1951.
399
 The three parties 
then held a number of symposiums and founded agencies for educational improvement in the 
1950s and 1960s. They also agreed to incorporate interstate and intercultural understanding 
and pacifism as the two pillars of Japanese education in the post-1945 era.
 400
 Such effort was 
succeeded and developed by MOFA in the early 1970s as an official governmental policy. 
The Ministry established a Cultural Affairs Department for policy-making, planning and 
implementation of cultural exchanges and cooperation.
401
  
 
While not many historians mentioned the presence, the Japanese delegate attended the 
Bandung Conference in April 1955.
402
 At the convention, the national representatives from 
twenty-eight governments of Asia and Africa discussed the role of the Third World in the 
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Cold War.
403
 They then agreed to form the so-called “Non-Align” bloc in which the countries 
decided to stay out of the Washington-Moscow antagonism. For the Japanese, Bandung 
served as a place to put Japan back in the Asian concert. In the post-war years, Japan’s 
relation with the rest of Asia was dominated by the memories of Japanese aggression in pre-
war and wartime years.
404
 The MOFA thus had not restored diplomatic relation with the vast 
majority of Asian states.
405
 The Government under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Hatoyama Ichiro (in office 1954-55) nonetheless saw the necessity to obtain a place in the 
Asian community because history had shown that mono-cultural foreign policy would not 
make Japan a truly ‘great’ nation.406 In other words, the authorities were determined not to 
merely become an American satellite and an advocate of the UN (which was de facto a West-
centric organization) but a nation has respected bonds with both the West and the East.
407
 
Hatoyama thus perceived the Bandung Conference as a great opportunity to build trustful 
relations with the Asian countries and reemphasize Japan’s Asian identity.408 In Bandung, the 
Japanese delegate started their speech with apologies for Japan’s wartime behaviour, a 
promise and friendly relations in the future, and plans for economic cooperation.
409 
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In this era, therefore, the principle of pacifism, return to Asia, and cooperation with the 
Western bloc were recognized as the three pillars of Japanese internationalism. The Japanese 
leaders were determined to make their foreign policy a multicultural doctrine in order to 
prepare for its UN membership and act as a bridge that connects states of different 
civilizational background.
410
 A country that respected world peace and showed multicultural 
understanding was the definition of a “Great Power” amongst the Japanese authorities in this 
era. 
 
 
Rise and Fall of UN-Centrism, 1956-2006 
 
 
 
Japan realized its UN membership on 18 December 1956.
411
 In his speech the Foreign 
Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru at UN General Assembly (UNGA) clarified Japan’s 
determination to make meaningful contribution to the UN system: 
The people of Japan today desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals 
controlling human relationships. We have determined to preserve our security and existence, 
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world … We desire to occupy an 
honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace … The substance of 
Japan's political, economic and cultural life is the product of the fusion within the last century of 
the civilizations of the Orient and the Occident. In a way, Japan may well be regarded as a bridge 
between the East and the West. She is fully conscious of the great responsibilities of such a 
position … 412 
Since then, the Japanese Government sent, again, some of the most talented officials to serve 
the UN system one after another. Prominent figures include Yasushi Akashi, Ogata Sadako, 
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Matsuura Koichiro, and Owada Hisashi.
413
 However, the Japanese Government, yet again, 
faced three major obstacles in accomplishing the goals Shigemitsu pointed out and becoming 
a truly respected power: (1) Article 9; (2) Japan’s national identity; and (3) the gap between 
the Government and the mass. As a matter of fact, the word ‘UN-centrism’ disappeared from 
the preamble of the Diplomatic Bluebook by 1958 – which was only two years after the 
successful admission.
414
   
 
Primarily, Article 9 became troublesome again. The constitutional ban on the overseas 
deployment of Self-Defence Force (SDF) had illegalized Japanese participation in some of 
the UN’s key missions. One of them was the humanitarian assistance activities such as the 
UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in which the member states sent their military forces 
as “UN peacekeepers” for the “peaceful settlement” of interstate disputes.415 Japan’s inability 
to participate in this operation limited Japan’s role at the Organization merely as a supporter 
of the UN fund. Some observers denounced Japan for not sharing the “blood” and “sweat” 
with the countries in the international community.
416
 The Japanese state had become the 
second largest donor of the UN fund only after the United States by the mid-1980s using the 
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wealth it earned during the economic miracle in the 1960s and 1970s.
417
 Yet, the fact that 
representatives of some countries continued to criticize Japanese contribution as “check-book 
diplomacy” or the “automatic teller machine of the UN” critically showed how Japan was not 
winning true respect from the international community.
418
 
 
The Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (in office 1964-72) reinforced the Japanese Government’s 
determination to stay out of international disputes furthermore in 1967. He was one of the so-
called Yoshida protégés who believed the Yoshida Doctrine as Japan’s absolute national 
creed. Sato enunciated the Three Non-Nuclear Principles at the National Diet and outlined 
that Japan should neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor should it permit their 
introduction into Japanese territory.
419
 The Prime Minister also formulated an act that banned 
weapons exports of any kind in the same year, constraining defence expenditure to less than 
one per cent of the GNP.
420
 These policies clearly indicated the Yoshida Doctrine’s chief 
principles were the solid consensus amongst Japanese authorities.
421
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The international community yet demanded more than the monetary contribution from the 
Japanese state.
422
 Countries of both the North and the South did not perceive such effort as 
enough endeavours that could fulfil Japan’s obligation as a member of the international 
community and the UN framework.
423
 Primarily, Euro-American leaders requested the 
Japanese Government as a member of the ‘Great Powers’ to play more roles in the assistance 
of underdeveloping countries, especially after Japan was elected as a non-permanent member 
of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1958.
424
 This also led some leaders of the West to 
request the Japanese Government to revise Article 9 in order to send the SDF to overseas 
destinations as part of UNPKO forces.
425
  
 
The countries of the South criticized Japan for not playing an effective role as the “bridge 
between the Occident and the Orient.”426 In the 1970s especially, decolonization began to 
steadily change the international climate. Because the UNGA’s main principle was majority 
rule, the South’s large number had become one of the determinants of UN decision-making 
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processes.
427
 The new states were weak economies, however. Most of them had an unstable 
economic basis and were unable to run their economy without the neo-colonial ‘assistance’ of 
the North. This nature forced the South to obey the North’s decisions at the UN.428 The AA 
Group thus announced the New International Economic Order (NIEO) at UNGA in 1972.
429
 
The underdeveloped countries of especially Asia and Africa demanded a more well-balanced 
economic structure that would restrain the North’s exploitation of the South.  
 
Japan as an ‘Asian industrialized state’ therefore stood in between the two opposing blocs. 
By the early 1980s, the AA Group yet started to identity the Japanese state as a “North 
colossus” in Asia and decided to de facto ousted Japan from the South bloc.430 This was 
largely because the post-1945 economic growth had made Japan’s international status more 
of a state that belonged to the North rather than to the South.
431
 The Japanese economic 
power was so influential, as Japan had become the world’s second largest economies by the 
1980s.
432
 The Japanese delegate at the UN system then started to become the “odd man out” 
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again.
433
 Denounced from both the North and the South, the Japanese leaders started to 
question the significance of the UN again.
434
   
 
The discord between the Japanese Government and the UN continued to intensify until 
Fukuda Takeo became the Prime Minister in December 1976.
435
 Fukuda saw that Japan’s 
lack of humanitarian assistance was revisable as it did not necessarily need the SDF to 
participate in armed conflicts.
436
 To start with, Fukuda decided to take part in the UNPKO 
mission in the Cambodian Crisis which had broken out in 1970.
437
 The Japanese Government 
accepted to welcome over ten thousand refugees from Indochina to temporarily stay in Japan 
from the late 1970s.
438
 This immigration policy was the first attempt in the post-1945 
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Japanese history that the Government allowed refugees to enter the Japanese territory. It was 
also one of the few cases in which the Japanese Government practiced international 
cooperation not in monetary form in the post-war era.
439
  
 
The next turning point to Japanese foreign policy came in 1990.
440
 The Gulf War broke out 
and the UN member states agreed to send their military force to stop the escalation of the 
Middle Eastern hostility. While countries such as America, France and Britain were 
organizing the “UN force” to be sent to the Gulf, Japan was “left out” from the core of 
decision-making processes.
441
 As a result of the factors explained above, the Western powers 
upon the outbreak of the Gulf War perceived Japan, again, merely as an “automatic teller 
machine” of the international community who would just dish “the money out” without 
taking part in any humanitarian mission.
442
 The Japanese Government under the leadership of 
Kaifu Toshiki (in office 1989-91) then began to realize that Article 9 needed an immediate 
and thorough revision.
 443
 They agreed that with the constitutional restriction Japan would 
never be able to obtain a truly respected title from the international community. 
                                                          
439
 Robert Immerman, "Japan in the United Nations," in Japan: A New Kind of Superpower?, ed. Craig Garby 
and Mary B. Bullock (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 182. According to Immerman, 
Japan also held a conference of the Cambodian parties in Tokyo, hosted a conference on economic 
reconstruction of Cambodia, and financed a substantial portion of the post-settlement UN operations in 
Cambodia as well. 
440
 Funabashi, Japan's International Agenda, 2-3. 
441
 Warren S. Hunsberger, ed. Japan’s Quest: the Search for International Role, Recognition, and Respect (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 96. For the UNSC’s statements, see: United Nations Security Council, "Security 
Council: Summary Statement by the Secretary-General on Matters of which the Security Council is Seized on 
the Stage reached in their Consideration," (New York: United Nations, 1991). 
442
Mayumi Itoh, "Japanese Constitutional Revision: A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9 in Comparative 
Perspective," Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (March 2001): 311; William M. Tsutsui, "Soft Power and the Globalization 
of Japanese Popular Culture," in Japan in the Age of Globalization, ed. Carin Holroyd and Ken Coates (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 145. The criticism on Japan increased especially after the Prime Minister Kaifu’s 
announcement that Japan would fund $9 billion in support of the Allied war efforts but mentioned nothing on 
humanitarian assistances. As a matter of fact, the ECOSOC’s report on the Gulf War published in March 1991 
did not mention Japan at all. For the source, see: United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Commission on 
Human Rights: Forty-Seven Session - Summary Record of the 11th Meeting," (United Nations, 1991). 
443
 For more on Japan’s diplomacy in the years of the Gulf War, see: Kent E. Calder, "Japan in 1991: Uncertain 
Quest for a Global Role," Asian Survey 32, no. 1 (1992). 
Page 105 of 125 
 
The Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCW) in June 1992.
444
 This act 
legalized SDF’s foreign deployment only when it served under UNPKO supervision. 445 The 
law thus enabled the Japanese to practice humanitarian assistance activities overseas without 
major legal restrictions (military actions were still against the constitution). The SDF’s first 
involvement took place in 1994.
446
 The Government sent the defence force to the UN Angola 
Verification Mission II in the aftermath of the Rwandan Civil War which forcefully displaced 
thousands of refugees in Angola and Zaire.
447
 The Japanese participation did not only mark 
the nation’s first intervention in an international settlement mission after August 1945, but 
also granted the SDF and governmental officials the opportunity to witness and experience 
how UNPKO worked in the real world.
448
 The frequency of Japanese involvement in the UN 
mission then started to increase from the early 1990s.
449
  
 
While the IPCW can be said as the symbol of Japan’s changing perception of international 
cooperation, equally important is the fact that the mass did not truly support the ratification of 
the Act. As Inoguchi points out, not many of the general public advocated SDF’s 
involvements in the Afghan War (2003) and the Iraq War (2006).
450
 Although the Japanese 
force’s role was limited to fuel the American, British and Pakistani military aircrafts and 
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rejected to play military roles, the overseas deployment of SDF itself was not understood by 
the mass as a positive practice.
451
 This situation indicated, just like in the previous eras of 
Japanese internationalism, that the gap between the Government and the public was growing 
again – which is indeed one of the ongoing problems of Japanese society of today.  
 
Unlike the military question, cultural internationalism saw no crucial problems in becoming 
the national consensus in both the private and public sectors. This is noticeable from the 
Japanese Government’s and the mass’s increasing interactions with UNESCO.452 In addition 
to MOFA’s establishment of the Cultural Affairs Department in the 1970s, the Japanese 
Government also founded the United Nations University in 1976 with the UN Secretary-
General U Thant’s support with the purpose to:  
… contribute, through collaborative research and education, dissemination, and advisory services, 
to efforts to resolve the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that 
are the concern of the United Nations, its Peoples and Member States.
453
 
The policy of cultural internationalism was strengthened furthermore in 1988, when the 
Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru announced in London that “cultural exchange would 
henceforth be one of the pillars of Japanese foreign policy.”454 One of its efforts was to take 
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part in UNESCO’s Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage mission in Cambodia in 
1995. A team of 650 architects, archaeologists, geologists, stone experts, conservators and 
measurement specialists from both private and public sectors was sent to the Temple of 
Bayon, the Royal Plaza of the Walled City of Angkor Thom and the Angkor Wat.
455
 The 
“large-scale intervention in Cambodia, undertaken through UNESCO” symbolized the 
country’s determination to contribute to the international community through using their 
highly developed degree of “scientific and technical work.”456  
 
Japan’s tie with UNESCO saw further development when the Japanese diplomat Matsuura 
Koichiro was elected the Director-General of UNESCO in 1999. His appointment caused two 
great changes in Japan’s UN policy. The first was that the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) began to launch a number of joint programs with 
UNESCO from the early 2000s.
457
 As seen in the rising number of Japanese involvement in 
the Organization’s scientific missions, Matsuura attempted to utilize the high standard of 
Japanese technology for the better of the international community.
458
 Secondly, the number 
of Japanese officials in UNESCO rapidly increased while Matsuura was in office. By 2009, 
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Japan became the second largest national group after the French.
459
 This nature reflected the 
Japanese Government’s intention to grant young Japanese officials the opportunity to actually 
experience multilateral situations. In doing so, Japan was supplementing its overall lack of 
international experience which was comparatively lower to their Euro-American 
counterparts.
460
 
 
This period hence saw active interactions between the UN system and the Japanese private 
and public sectors. The rise of the humanitarian and cultural efforts indicated, to a large 
extent, that Japanese understanding of internationalism was no longer military-orientated or 
solely finance-orientated.
461
 By the late 1990s, cultural internationalism started to occupy an 
important place in Japanese foreign policy. These developments evidenced the rise of a 
national creed amongst the Japanese authorities that Japan’s bond with the world must not 
only be multilateral but also multifaceted in pursing the goal to become an honourable 
member of the international community. That is, the nation (both private and public) must 
practice all economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian roles for the “greatest happiness 
of the greatest number.”462 Yet, as mentioned above, the Government must not disregard the 
general public’s discontent with the decision to play ‘humanitarian’ role that involved SDF to 
be sent to warzones worldwide. History has shown Japanese internationalism saw negative 
developments when the gap between the Government and the mass had enlarged.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Prospects 
 
 
 
“Man differs fundamentally from the animals, however, because in addition he desires the 
desire of other men, that is, he wants to be “recognized.””463 
- Francis Fukuyama 
 
 
 
 
The study of Japanese diplomatic ideology and the comprehensive illustration of Japanese 
diplomacy were the unidentified theme in the discipline. In order to reveal the themes, the 
turning points in the history of Japanese internationalism have revisited, with the hope of 
resurrecting the undiscovered features which once surrounded it.   
 
The core value of Japan’s diplomatic ideology was the ambition to make Japan a respected 
power in the international community. Honour and dignity were what the Japanese authorities 
had striven to obtain throughout history. Between the 1850s and late 1920s, Westernization 
was the national creed to make Japan a “Great Power.” The adoption of the world’s most 
advanced technologies and thoughts was believed to turn the Japanese empire into one of the 
most “respected” countries in the international community. In the post-1945 world, Yoshida 
and his protégés proposed economism as the national consensus. They attempted to revive 
Japan’s international status through urging the Japanese state to become an economic 
superpower.  The British sociologist Ronald Dore comments that this dynamics might be 
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possible to explain in terms of Bushido the Japanese national character.
 464
 As Nitobe had 
described, Samurai wisdom had developed the “shame culture” amongst Japanese society that 
regarded honour as the greatest reputation a person could possibly get.
465
  
 
The Japanese definition of a “Great Power” had dramatically changed in the course of history. 
In the first era, Westernization was considered as the most fundamental element that made a 
state a “Great Power” and not a “savage state.”466  Incorporation of Euro-American standards, 
such as industrialization, imperialism and colonialism, was glorified as the symbol of 
modernity amongst the elites in this period. The deteriorating relation between Japan and the 
West in the late 1920s yet changed this consensus. With the radical outburst of Pan-Asianism 
and nationalism, the Japanese concept of “Great Power” was redefined.467 The 
ultranationalists reconceptualised a ‘Great Power’ as an empire that could defend its regional 
brotherhood (i.e. Asia) and expel strangers (i.e. the Euro-American empires) from its sphere 
of influence The Pacific War was the best example that illustrated this thought.  
 
With the devastating defeat in August 1945, nonetheless, the policymakers faced the need to 
reorganize the definition again. For the post-war leaders, history had shown that aggression 
was not the right choice. Yoshida and his protégés thus proposed the pacifist doctrine. They 
urged Japan to re-rise as an economic superpower that would assist the wellbeing of the 
international community as the new form of a “Great Power” that Japanese people must aim 
to become. This changing perception of honour was the situational value of Japanese 
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diplomacy. The Japanese leaders redefined the idea of a “Great Power” in accordance with 
the changing climate of the international community and demands of the general public. 
So in the end, there is a strong view that ideology is one of the bonds that constitute the 
dynamics of international community. In addition to political influence and economic wealth, 
the Japanese case has shown that the conceptual desire to obtain respect from the members of 
the world was also a significant factor.  
 
The future of Japanese diplomacy will depend to a great extent on how policymakers and 
intellectuals respond to the international climate and perceive Japan’s status as a “Great 
Power.” The world of today is witnessing a great variety of international issues, from poverty 
to AIDS to drugs and to terrorism.
468
 The Japanese challenge, as this thesis has explored, is 
the necessity of multi-polarizing the diplomatic thought. In order to obtain a truly respected 
title in the international community, Japanese authorities need to find the just balance of 
internationalism that would satisfy both its quest to honour and the demands of the 
international community.         
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